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GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT: Vf*
HISTORY AND THEORY, CONTINUED
In addition to the historical doctrines justifying governmental ir-
responsibility, already discussed,1 it seems proper to review the more
modern doctrines and theories advanced in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries either to deny or to support the responsibility of the State or
other public corporation for the torts of its officers.
The recognition of governmental responsibility for the torts of
officers required certain political and social conditions which, until com-
paratively modern times, hardly prevailed in the western world. It was
necessary for political theory to mature to a position according the
individual a large measure of recognition for his personal rights, even
against the group-a condition possible only in a highly developed polit-
ical and legal system.2 Both state and official responsibility advanced
with the growth of individualism, demanding protection against inva-
sion of private rights by public officials. On the other hand, a well-
developed social sense is required to realize that exceptional losses, due
to the imperfections of governmental machinery or the torts of officers,
should not be permitted to rest where they happen to fall, but should
be distributed over the group as a whole.
Modem laissez-faire, while admitting wide claims on the part of
the individual, has been opposed to a system of group responsibility, or
at least was not inclined to regard an officer's tort as a group tort. In
that view, it was supported by centuries of legal development, which
asserted that fault could bepersonal only, that a corporation could not
commit a tort,-which required an act of "will,"-and could not even be
held responsible for torts committed by an officer or employee; that a
public officer was not an agent of the State except for contractual mat-
* The first six parts of this study have appeared in volumes 34 and 36 of the
YALE LAW JouRNAL.
'The doctrines that a corporation is incapable of tort, that the King can do
no wrong and that the State is above the law. (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039.
Possibly Montesquieu in a famous passage of his Esprit des Lois (Nu-
gent ed., London, 1923), Book XXVI, c. 15, may be regarded as the first modern
publicist, certainly in France, to emphasize the two essential elements of govern-
mental responsibility, namely, that individuals have legal rights against the
group (the State), and that there must be a legal (judicial) sanction against
invasions of such rights. Montesquieu's doctrine was embodied in article 17
of the "Declaration of the Rights of Man" to the effect that private property
cannot be taken except for public purposes, legally established, and under con-
dition precedent of a just indemnity. After the French Revolution it was ad-
mitted that the public obligations of the state were equally enforceable legally,
regardless of change in Government. The next step was to make the State re-
sponsible to a certain extent for the integrity and good conduct of its officers.
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
ters within the scope of his employment; that his power in any event
was limited to acting rightfully and that when he acted wrongfully
he was ultra vires and made himself alone liable; and that the individual
was adequately protected if he could sue the officer. Even after the
possibility of corporate torts had been admitted, and down to the end
of the nineteenth century, it was still widely believed that the demands
of individual justice and public security were adequately satisfied by
leaving the individual to seek redress from the wrong-doing officer.
With minor exceptions, that is still at the present writing, though with
strong possibilities of early change, the general position of the Anglo-
American law with respect to the largest units of government-empire,
kingdom, federal and state government.
The continent has gone further. Recognizing the inadequacy of
individual relief against public officers, if not the frequent injustice
of exposing public officers to full pecuniary responsibility for official
mistakes, several of the countries of continental Europe and some of
the British colonies, stimulated by the writings of jurists, have by statute
removed the barriers to State responsibility which the older theory had
found it impossible or inexpedient to remove or overcome. They recog-
nized the agency theory as applied to public officers, and they abandoned
or qualified the doctrine of sovereignty as applied to official torts, by
permitting direct suit by the injured individual against the State.
This development was aided by several factors. They had, at least
in central Europe, long been familiar with suits against the Government
in "fiscal" (fiscus) matters, and the courts, without express statutory
authority, had subjected the State or minor governmental subdivision
to the rules of private law in the matter of the management of its public
property, contract relations and the operation of public utilities, such
as state railroads, telegraphs and even postal services-such matters as
would be characterized, in the American law of municipal corporations,
as "corporate" functions. They bad seen the Government entering into
an ever greater number of activities and had found it difficult to main-
tain the classic distinction between "governmental" and "corporate"
functions and acts. They had become familiar, through centuries of
legal development, with the crystallization of the doctrines of eminent
domain, which, acquiring constitutional protection in all western coun-
tries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had evolved enforceable
limitations against governmental invasion of the rights of private prop-
erty.3 They had observed that such institutions as workmen's compen-
SThe institution of eminent domain, requiring compensation and public
purpose as conditions precedent to the expropriation of and, later, damage to
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sation and other forms of social insurance were introducing into the law
new theories of responsibility, resting upon objective risk rather than
upon personal fault or negligence, and that as to its own employees,
the State by employer's liability statutes recognized its responsibilities
as a corporate employer. They found the doctrine of sovereignty at-
tacked as a remnant of political theology and an unnecessary encum-
brance on governmental institutions. Thus endowed with an eman-
cipated social vision, the jurists of the late nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries who, notably in France and Germany, so largely influenced the
against public impairment. It had a rudimentary form in the Roman law with
compensation voluntary, in that no right of action was accorded.
In Italy, the postglossators recognized the doctrine and in central Europe,
both through feudal times and after the institution of the modern State, it was
highly developed. The school of natural law vigorously defended private prop-
erty against impairment by the State. The Fifth Amendment embraces such
protection. In France, however, the ancien rgitme, abusing what they believed
were the absolute rights of sovereignty, gave little legal protection to private
property. One of the principal features of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man of 1793 is the constitutional protection demanded for private property
against expropriation by the State. Statutes, particularly one of 1810, gave
eminent domain a precise and judicial form.- It is an interesting legal phe-
nomenon that the comparatively late statutory recognition of eminent domain
in France has resulted in a more vigorous protection than anywhere else against
all public invasions, rightful or wrongful, of the rights of the individual. The
equalization of sacrifice, involved in compensation under eminent domain, is
but one aspect of the compensation accorded for invasions of other private rights
in the conduct of public business. See GiERKE, JOHANNES ALTHusius, (3d ed.
Breslau, 1913), 264 et seq. MEYER, Das Recht des Expropriation, (Leipzig, 1868),
§§ 1 et seq. esp. § 6. LAYER, Principien des Enteignungsrechtes (Leipzig, 1902),
64 et seq. GROiNHuT, Das Enteignungsrecht (Wien, 1873), § 3. ANscairrz, Der
Ersatzansprnch aus Verm6gensbescliddigungen durch rechtmissige Handhabung
der Staatsgewalt (Berlin, 1897), 28 et seq. For an outline of the historical de-
velopment in France down to the French Revolution, see DAR sTE, Une expro-
priation sous l'ancienne inonarchie (1872) REV.E DE LEGISLATION, 179; La
justice administrative en France, (2d ed. Paris, 1898), c. 17. MARCQ, La respon-
sabilit6 de la puissance publique (Paris-Bruxelles, 1911) 278 et seq., PicoT, De
la responsabilitj de I'Etat du fait de ses priposs (Paris, 1920) 26 et seq.
Eminent domain statutes, prior to the nineteenth century, are rare.
In England, though all land came from the King, private property had con-
stitutional protection against kingly or official impairment before it had such
protection elsewhere. Its origin is said to be Germanic, whereas the Middle
Age practice in Europe rests largely on Roman origins (MEYER, § 6). Magna
Carta (1215) provided, cc. 39, 52, that no freeman was to be disseized except by
the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land (due process of law).
This required compensation. McKEcHNmF, MAGNA CARTA, (2d ed. 1914) 383,
448. BLACKSTONE, I, *138; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW,(1899) 3 et seq. 2 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTIUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th
ed. 1927) cc. 11, 15. It is strange that the early recognition of the duty to make
compensation for the statutory or authorized impairment of real property in
Anglo-American law, and, in England, for many tortious injuries to property
by petition of right, should have left public opinion and the law oblivious to
the analogous duty to repair other tortiouts official injuries to persons or prop-
erty. While the impairment or invasion of private right in eminent domain is
based on a formal government act, so are many tortious invasions of private
rights. See the interesting case of McMahon v. Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244
(1926) in which the erroneous destruction of a building as a nuisance, by order
of the mayor and council, was deemed a taking for the "public use," thereby escap-
ing the inhibition against suit in tort.
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courts and legislatures in adopting the modern view of governmental
responsibility for the torts of officers, confined their differences to vary-
ing explanations of the basis of the new responsibility and to diverse
views of the limitations and exceptions to be placed upon its application.
Thus the continental historical development proceeds, in the main,
from an insistence, in principle, upon State non-responsibility for tor-
tious "governmental" acts, with certain exceptions, to the admission,
in principle, of State responsibility, with certain qualifications. It will
be our purpose to survey this development and to observe the legal
theories which have accompanied it.
THE DOCTRINE OF IRRESPONSIBILITY
As the problem of governmental responsibility in tort was essentially
a legal one, it is natural that both advocates and opponents of such
responsibility should look to the Roman law for authority. Neither
group can find much satisfaction in that source. The Roman law was
unfamiliar with those conceptions of individualism and legal protection
of the individual against the group which make the present problem a
practical one. The Roman State could not be a party to a suit, although
an ingenious system of assignments and confession of judgment was
worked out which enabled the State to collect its claims and enabled a
creditor by novation to sue some debtor of the State.4 The rudiments
of eminent domain were known, though only as a practice of equitably
granting the expropriated owner some other property, certain privileges
or money, and not as a legal right of the individual to sue.5 Tax fermers
and other concessionaires of public revenues could be sued if they col-
lected too much." Public works were constructed under the direction
'CouzlNra, Etude sur la responsabilitg des groupements administratifs
(Paris, 1911) 11. At the beginning of the Empire, so long as the distinction
lasted between the aerarium (treasury of the Empire) and the fisc (private
fortune of the Emperor) the individual was not helpless. He could sue the Em-
peror (fisc) personally in "corporate" matters (public works, construction of
roads, etc.). But this liability ceased with the unification of the imperial
budget. 1 SMU.IGNY, Droit public et administratif romain (Paris, 1862) 96, 97,
104; 2 ibid. 1 et seq. See also Jones, The early history of the Fiscus (1927) 43
L. Q. REv. 499.
' There is some dispute among the authorities as to the extent of the prac-
tice and the conditions of making compensation for private property taken. It
is agreed that the taking gave rise to no legal claim of the individual. A con-
siderable technical procedure had, however, developed, notwithstanding that
the claim was not judicially enforceable against the State. de Fresquet, Prin-
cipes de 'expropriation pour cause d'utilitj publique a Rome .... (1860) 6 Rlv.
HisTOIrQuE DE DROIT FRANCAIS, 97 et seq. 2 SERRIGNY, Op. cit. supra note 4, 247
et seq. CouzINET, op. cit. supra note 4, 14, citing Tacitus and the article of
Fresquet, states that compensation was made, in certain cases, to grain mer-
chants by the legislative fixing of maximum prices and also to the unconsenting
owner of slaves, freed by legislative decree. For an outline of the status of
expropriation in Rome, see PicoT, op. cit. supra note 3, 19 et seq.
'2 SERRIGNY, op. cit. supra note 4, 165, 210.
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of certain officials (curatores operum), a kind of supervising architects,
who dealt with the building contractors. For fifteen years, they re-
mained responsible for the sound construction of the works. 7 The
Roman municipalities could be held to a considerable responsibility, even
penal, but only to the State and not to individual citizens.8 But the re-
sponsibility of municipal and provincial officers for their management9
and more particularly the responsibility of judges' ° was well known
in the Roman law. Their responsibility to the people or the Senate or
the Emperor was also highly developed."1
Fault was essential to legal responsibility for damages, and as fault
presupposed an act of "will," only individuals could commit fault. The
corporation, the universitas, which up to the Empire existed in public
law alone, was a legal concept only; its activities were determined by its
organs, who could not by their torts make the universitas responsible.
Thus all forms of universitas, including the State, were incapable of
tort, and were responsible only if they had been unjustly enriched.12
" 2 S mtG Y, op. cit. supra note 4, 237, and note 7, citing the Theodosian and
Justinian Codes.8 MEsra, Les personnes morales et le problame de leur responsabiliti pinale
(Paris, 1899) 34 et seq. For the doctrinal disputes in this matter, see RoGu ,
De la personnaliti des municipes (Valenciennes, 1891), 74-78. CHaOPPARD, De, la
responsabilitg des municipes en droit romain (Paris, 1874), 48 et seq. RFnoD DE
COLOMBIER, De la responsabilitg des municipes e) droit romain (Paris, 1887), 55
et seq.e The municipal and provincial magistrates, the duumvirs, were responsible
to the citizens for their management of public affairs and also, it seems, for
the acts of their successors whom they appointed. 1 SERRIGNY, op. cit. supra
note 4, 138; so also were the members of the municipal Senate or decurions, ibid.
224; 2 ibid 62. This responsibility was so crushing that it was hard to find per-
sons willing to take the office of decurion. COutZINE, op. cit. supra note 4, 16.
The governors of provinces could be sued personally for certain official torts
after the termination of the office. 1 SERRIGNY, 132. During the Republic, there
existed double magistrates as a guaranty against arbitrary acts and torts of ad-
ministrative officials, as well as responsibility to superiors and the tribune of the
people. COUziNET, 12. Roguin, op. cit, supra note 8, 27 et seq.; Choppard, op.
cit. supra note 8, 27 et seq.
" Zachariae, Ueber die Haftungsverbindlichkeit des Staats aus rechtswidrigen
Handlungen und Unterlassungen seiner Beamten (1863) 19 ZTSCHR. F. D. GES.
STAATswissENscfAr, 582, at 584. Scli&.rz, Die Ersatzpflicht des Staates (Zu-
rich, 1918), 6. The responsibility of judges will be more fully discussed in an-
other article. With respect to the highest magistrates, the magistratus cure im-
perio, no civil suit appears to have been possible during their term of office.
sTErm, Die privatrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit des rimischen- Richters gegeniiber
den Parteien (Zurich, 1877), 63. Under the principle per majdrve potestas there
was no official before whom he could be brought, and on his political side, he
was not subject to the common law. Cf. the position of the English King and'
the reasons advanced for his immunity from suit. (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 17
et seq.
For the conditions under which officials and official bodies could be sued,
and under what conditions in municipalities the so-called nominatores and
creatores were liable, see PUcHTA, PANDEXTEN (12th ed. 1877) §§ 354, 358.21LAouLAYE, Essai sur les lois criminelles des Romains, concernant la
responsabiliti des nagistrats (Paris, 1845) 196 et seq.
22 (1926) 36 YALE L. 3. 4 et seq. and 3 GImnx, Das Deutsche Genossen-
schaftsrecht (1887) 168 et seq.
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The agency theory in Roman law was equally barren of helpful
analogies for governmental responsibility. Agency was practically lim-
ited to the conclusion of contracts, and the principal was liable only
within the scope of the agent's power. The agent's tort was a violation
of his power, not imposing responsibility on the principal, but only on
the tort-feasor, who by his illegal act had ceased to be an agent.18
While the exercitor and institor relation, under the Praetor's law, made
the employer liable for certain torts of the employee, the analogy was
of little value in the case of corporations, who could not be made liable
in tort. At most, it was in contractual relations, such as purchase, sale
and contract generally, that the doctrines of agency could be employed
to bind corporations, who could deal only through agents acting within
the scope of their powers.14 In this limited field, however, the Govern-
ment, in its "corporate" (fiscus) capacity, was subject to many of the
rules of law governing private corporations,' 5 and thus the ground was
laid for that distinction between the private and public law relations of
the State which so greatly influenced modern continental law. But a
responsibility for culpa in eligendo or custodiendo could not be charged
against corporations, who were incapable either of will or fault.
As already observed,16 the Middle Age Germanic conception of in-
dividual rights and group obligations was quite different. The associa-
tion, public and private, was not conceived as a separate entity, but as
a collectivity, which was responsible for all acts of its.individual mem-
bers and a fortiori, of its organs, managers and officers. 17 Public law
and private law were not clearly distinguished. While certain noblemen,
later feudal lords, arrogated to themselves certain prerogatives which by
custom gained common acquiescence, the legal conception of "State"' 8
(1926) 36 YALE L. J. 4.
"
4Ibid. 6 et seq.
'The Fi.cus, as the private fortune of the Emperor, though it achieved
the same status as the aerarium publicum and ultimately submerged the latter,
remained nevertheless subject to rules of private law. It appears in late Roman
times even to have been deemed theoretically a juristic person-though Gierke
says that the Roman jurists did not so regard it-yet with so many exceptions
from the ordinary rules of responsibility that Gierke says the exceptions
reversed the principle, op. cit. supra note 12, III, 60. 1 MIrms, R6misches Prl-
vatrecht (Leipzig, 1908) 348 et seq. 2 MOMMSEN, Rimisches Staatsrecht (Leip-
zig, 1876) 998. FxoamBa, Die Haftung des Fiskus ffir seine Vertreter (Leip-
zig, 1908) 9. See 3.6 YALE L. J. 5, note 8.
"Ibid. 8 et seq.
"' 1 GiERKE, Deutsches Privatrecht (1895) §§ 68, 75, 76.
2 GnmiK, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht (1873) 386, 522, 817; 3 ibid.168.
3 ScHiiTz, op. cit. supra note 10, 9.
The city was the highest unit, as a subject of law, known to the early Ger-
man law. It was simple later to carry the rules of law from city to state. 2
Gimuyx, Genossenschaftsrecht (1873) 831.
Nor was the Fiscus as a subject of rights and duties known to early German
law. It was first used in Germany in the early Middle Ages to designate the
-king's property. 2 GiiE~,I op. cit. supra note 17, 565, et seq.
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was unknown and it is not possible to speak of a State responsibility
for torts of officers. When later the State conception did develop, the
Roman law conceptions of corporate immunity in tort, with the narrow
qualifications admitted by the postglossators 9 came with it. Then also,
from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, there flourished the no-
tions of sovereignty and royal prerogative, deemed to imply irresponsi-
bility, a view which still prevails in England and the United Siates more
strongly than anywhere else, but which retarded the development of
the responsible State everywhere.
Notwithstanding the popular convictions respecting group respon-
sibility, and the efforts of jurists to find in isolated institutions of the
Roman law some authority or analogy for such responsibility, it was
not until the political theories of the eighteenth century, culminating in
the French Revolution, endowed the individual with constitutional pro-
tection for his rights against group invasions, that the present problem
acquired an immediate practical importance enlisting in its solution the
cooperation of legislatures, courts and jurists. The issue became one of
the leading problems of the nineteenth century. That century is marked
by a gradual progression from a conviction against State responsibility
to one in its favor. The movement was incidental to changing political
theories which openly challenged the consequences of the alleged divine
right of kings and sovereign infallibility and unaccountability and substi-
tuted notions of democracy, of self-government, and social theories which
envisaged the end and purpose of society in individual security and social
welfare. Lawyers who opposed responsibility invoked the silence of
the Roman law, the historic immunity of corporations in tort, the dis-
similarity between an officer and an agent, the conception of sovereignty
and the adequacy of suits against officers; those who favored it invoked
isolated texts of the Roman law, the Germanic conception of group
See 36 YAL-E L. J. 10.
The postglossators first recognized distinctions between the State as a
Fiscus (corporation) and the State as a governing power. Fiscus was defined
as a property concept, and the corresponding legal owner the head of the State
and later the State itself. Tile State was then also acknowledged as a juristic
person. 3 Gimx, op. cit. supra note 18, 359, 397, 405. Thus the doctrine ar-
rived in Germany at the time of the "Reception" (1495). The German concep-
tions of the Fiscus began to prevail over the Roman. But it was not until the
nineteenth century that public attention was directed to the markedly different
legal consequences attached to the Fiscus and to the State as a governing au-
thority. When Sundheim wrote his celebrated monograph in 1827 (infra)
he made no distinction in State responsibility between "corporate" and
"governmental" acts. Some of the modern civilists who advocate general State
responsibility also do not admit the distinction. CHiRoNI, La Colpa iel diritto
civile odierno. Colpa contrattuale, (2d ed. Torino, 1897) 490 et seq., ibid. Colpa
estracontrattuale, (2d ed. 1903) I, 354; II, 1.
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responsibility for official, even individual, torts, the growing recognition
of corporate responsibility in tort, the similarity between the officer and
the agent, the analogy between private and public corporations, the de-
cadence of the doctrine of sovereignty and the inadequacy of relief
against officers.
'Down to the eighties of the last century, an influential section of
the scientific world, which on the continent always exerted a strong in-
fluence over legislatures and courts, seems to have been impressed with
the arguments against responsibility, though exceptions were always
admitted. Heffter,20 von Mohl,21 Bluntschli,2 2 Loening,2 3 Gabba,24
HRFFTER, Beitrge aura deutschen Stoats und Fiirstenrecht (Berlin, 1829)
162 et seq. See also VON DER BEcxE, Von Staatsiintern und Staatsdiencr' (Heil-
bron, 1797) 177 quoted by Zachariae, loc. cit. supra note 10, 596, and Richelmann(1852) 2 MAGAziN FfUR HANNOVERISCHES RECHT, 343 cited by Zacbariae, 614, 615,
and paraphrased by ScHELcHER, Die Haftung des Staates ffir Eingriffe in Pri-
vatrechte (Leipzig, 1921) 30. Heffter later (1851) changed his mind and pre-
dicted that the principle of state responsibility would be generally recognized.
Archiv des Criminalrechts (1851) 455 cited by Zachariae, 598.
AVON MOHL, System der Priventiv-Justiz oder Rechtspolizei (2d ed. 1845)
555 et seq.
'Bluntschli, (1865) 1 VERHANDLUNGEN DEs 6. DEUTSCHEN JURISTEFNTAGS,
45-52. The same general view, unless statute expressly provides otherwise, is
adopted by Lorenz von Stein, Zorn, v. Rdnne, Dernburg, Ffrster, Jellinek, v.
Seydel, Rehm, Cosack and Bornhak. See the citations to the works of these
eminent jurists in Dock, Die Haftung des Staates aus rechtswidryqen Hand-
lungen seiner Beatnten, in (1900) 16 ARcHIV FOR 6FFENTL. REcHT, 244, at 250.
See also SCriELCHER, op. cit. supra note 20, 29. Some of the supposed arguments
against responsibility, notably the postulate that "the State" is incapable of
wrongdoing, are set forth in COzaBOTHEcRA, Monographies de droit public, (Paris,
1909) 148 et seq.; and in Rayces, Responsabilidad del poder pubhco, (1917) 34
RMvSTA JURIDICA Y DE CIENCIAS SOCIAL.ES, 15 et seq., 139, 155 et seq.
LoENING, Die Haftung des Staats aus rechtswidrigen Handlungen seiner
Beamten (Dorpat, 1879) 134. This monograph, which has become a classic,
is one of the ablest ever written on the subject. Loening maintains that no
general principle of State responsibility can be predicated on the relation of
State to officer or officer to individual but that each activity must be independently
investigated to determine whether responsibility is justified or not. His posi-
tion is not therefore one of outright opposition to State responsibility, but ap-
proximates that of the Tribunal of Conflicts in its celebrated decision in the
Blanco case (1873), Lebon, 61, TEiSSER, La responsabiltW dc la puissance pub-
lique (Paris, 1906) 78 n.
' Gabba, Della responsabilitd dello stato per danno dato ingiustamente as
privati da pubblici funizonari nell' esercizio delle loro attribuzioni, (1881) 6
FoRo ITALIANO, Part 1, col. 932. See comment in MEuccI, Instituzioni di diritto
amninlstrativo (6th ed. Torino, 1909), 252-255, citing Italian decisions and litera-
ture, and 5 GIORGI, Teoria delle obbligazioni (7th ed. 1909) 552 et seq. While the
classical theory of irresponsibility for "governmental" acts still predominates in Italy,
it is being broken down by the opinions of jurists and numerous decisions of the
courts. See Siciliani, Le responsabilita dello Stato e degli enti pubblici per ifatti illeciti dei loro funzionari (1904) 38 RivsTA IrAL. PER LE sCIENZE GIURIuDIHE
1 at 81, 83, 88. TRENTIN, La responsabilita collegiale. (Milano, 1910) 337 et seq. 431
et seq. FORTr, Studi e questioni di diritto amministrativo. (Torino, 1906)
c. VII. For a criticism of the theory of irresponsibility, see GIORGI, op, cit. 53d
et seq. and ibid., Dottrina delle persone giuridiche (2d ed. Firenze, 1900) 151
et seq. Also CHnioNi, op. cit. supra note 19 (Colpa contrattuale) 497.
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Sarwey,25 Piloty,26 Laferri~re,27 Michoud,28 Larombi~re, 29 Sourdat,30
and leading decisions of the German,31 French,32 Swiss, 33 Italian3 4 and
other courts adopted the catagorical view that in all matters affecting the
State or minor public corporation in a capacity other than as a property
owner or contractor, the tort of an officer was personal to him alone.
For their authority, these jurists rely upon the older views that fault is
personal, that a corporation cannot commit a tort or that an officer com-
mitting a tort is either no agent at all or acts ultra vires. Their main
thought, however, to support which they rationalize legal rules, is that
there is no adequate ground of public policy justifying the State in its
SARwEY, Das 6ffentliche Recht und die Verwaltungsrechtspflege (Tiibingen,
1880), 304, citing Stein, von R~nne, and others in. support.
Piloty, Die Haffung des Staates fiir rechtswidrige Handlungen und Unter-
lassungen der Beamten. Hirth's ANNALEN DEs DEUTSCHEN R-ICHS (1888) 245 et
seq. q 2 LAFR E, Traitg de la Juridiction Administrative, (2d ed. 1896) 13, 184.
Laferri6re, formerly President of the Council of State, asserts that it is "a
peculiarity of the State that it exerts its power against everyone without respon-
sibility for injury. See Tisan, De la responsabilitj de la puissance publique
(Paris, 1906) 66.23Michoud, De la Responsabilitg de l'Etat d raison des fautes de ses agents,
(1895) 3 REv. DE DRoir PuB. 401. Michoud in 1895, insisted on the validity of the
classical distinction between acts of gestion (public and private) and acts of
puissance publique. Tb the former, he would apply articles 1382 et. seq. of the
civil code. For the latter, he held the State not responsible because he could
find no legal principle that was applicable. "Public law" and "equity" he deemed
too vague. He advocated progressive legislation making the State responsible.
By 1909, when he published his Thiorie de la. personnaliti morale (2d ed. 1924)
258 et seq., he confessed that he could find "principles" of public law on which
to hold the State responsible even as a puissance publique. See MAxcQ, op. cit.
supra, note 3, 246.0 7 LAROMBItRE, Thgorie et pratique des Obligations (Paris, 1885) 617, com-
mentary on Article 1384 C. C.
. 2 SOuTRDAT, Traiti gingral de la responsabilitj (6th ed. Paris, 1911) § 1304.
' Staatsfiskus zu Weimar v. B, April 8, 1884, R. G. Zivilsachen 11, p. 206
(1884). The court declined to admit that by the appointment of an officer the
State assumed any guaranty for his conduct. See Von BERNEGG, Ueber die
Entschdigungspflicht des Staates bei Ausiibung der Offentlichen Gewalt (Berne
dissertation, Borna-Leipzig, 1921) 67. ScHELcHER, op. cit. supra note 20, 32.
0 Rothschild v. State, Council of State. Dec. 6, 1855, Lebon, 705. Lepreux v.
State, Jan. 13, 1899, Dalloz 1900, 3, 42. BIGOT DENGENTE, De la responsabilitg
p~cuniaire de l'Etat (Paris, 1907) 70, 100. TmARD, op. cit. supra, note 27, 90. An
analysis of the French decisions, both of the Court of Cassation and the Council
of State, will be found in TARD, c. IV, pp. 72-91. The French courts relied
largely on the doctrine of separation of powers in refusing to permit the admin-
istration to be sued in tort, and, down to 1903, generally denied the application
of the civil code to torts of officers performing "governmental" functions.
FAilA, Les transformations des principes de la responsabilitj en droit public
et privi (Paris, 1923) 85.
1 See decision of Bundesgericht of Jan. 8, 1861, cited by 2 ULLmER,
Staatsrechtliche Praxis, 1848-1863 (Zurich, 1862-66) No. 955; Vanini v. Canton
of Ticino, Bundesgericht, Feb. 11, 1881, 7 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichts,
127, 136. BERNEGG, op. cit. supra note 31, 67, 68.
2' See the decisions cited by Gabba in 6 FoRo ITALIANO, (1881) 935 and in
Raneletti, Per la distinzione tragli atti d'impero et di gestioni, in STUDI IN
oNoaR. Di VIrTOuO ScIALOJA (Milan, 1905) 701 et seq.
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"public" as distinguished from its "private" capacity, in -assuming re-
sponsibility for the torts of officers.
Bluntschli discussed the subject in 1865, when there was already, as
we shall see, a considerable popular and professional demand for the as-
sumption by the State of responsibility in tort, at least in a subsidiary
way. After attempting to show that the legal theories of fault and
agency excluded State liability, he added that equitable considerations
also negatived such responsibility. He contended that it was a mistake
to believe that severe burdens should be borne by the State to the relief
of the citizen; that the citizen pays no premium for such insurance, as he
does in the case of state fire insurance; that taxes would be greatly in-
creased and state economy disturbed; that the tendency of legislation was
to protect officers against promiscuous suit, thus narrowing the claims
of the individual, and that the assumption by the State of the officer's
responsibility would be likely to restrict still more the individual's right
of recourse. Bluntschli admitted exceptions to irresponsibility in case (a)
an individual deposited money with a court or other public officer, in
which case the office rather than the officer was trusted; (b) in case the
State takes control of property by compulsion, as in sequestrations,
search of prisoners, etc., and (c) in case the State operates public utilities
as a private corporation might, in which event it was subject to the or-
dinary rules of private law.3 5 To exception (a) court deposits, Heifter
would apply the qualification, as some American courts still do80 that
the State responsibility can only be sustained if the State has expressly
assumed a guaranty or control and supervision over the money or func-
tion, e.g., the keeping of a mortgage register. But Heffter would admit
(d) responsibility for the misuse or abuse of governmental powers which
the State has directly commanded or for failure to exercise proper super-
vision, and (e) in the event of the unconstitutional appointment of a
wrong-doing officer.3 7
Piloty rejects the doctrine of State responsibility by disputing, as
unsubstantial fictions, the arguments upon which responsibility has been
founded. He denies the validity of the artificial public law "personality"
'*Bluntschli, loc. cit. supra note 22. For an excellent critique of Blunt-
sdbli's views, with the general conclusion of which he agrees, see LO-NING, op. cit.
supra note 23, 108.
'The public officer entrusted with public moneys is held to a high degree
of responsibility, often almost that of an insurer. In most jurisdictions, he is
held personally responsible for loss through the failure of a bank in which he
has deposited the funds. U. S. v. Prescott, 3 How. 578 (U. S. 1845) ; Shelton v.
State, 53 Ind. 331, 334 (1876) ; Wiley v. Sparta, 154 Ga. 1, 114 S. E. 45 (1922).
See 22 R. C. L. § 136 et seq. 191 et seq. The suggestion that the State ought to
assume responsibility to citizens for the safety of funds turned over to public
depositaries is hard to find in American decisions.
" Op. cit. supra note 20, 162, Zachariae, loc. cit. supra note 10, 597.
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of the State, in order to impose responsibility as upon a private corpora-
tion; he denies that this artificial "personality" appoints officers; or that
their acts are equivalent to acts of the State; or that the citizen is bound
to obey the artificial "personality" called State or its officers. Only the
State's assumption of responsibility by contract or statute or its "own"
fault, says Piloty, could impose responsibility. The suggestion that by
appointment of the officer the State impliedly assumes such contractual
responsibility or guaranty, Piloty contests by asserting that this is merely
a roundabout way of basing liability on fault; he demands, on the con-
trary, some express assumption of responsibility. The argument that
the State is responsible because it has appointed the officer, Piloty says,
arrives by indirection at the old private law fault in selection under the
mandate theory, though actually the modern French theory is very par-
tial to the view that because the State, by appointment, has enabled the
officer to commit injury, the State should bear the resulting responsibility.
Piloty states that a mere feeling that justice requires State responsibility
is insufficient; he insists upon an established legal theory in support and
finds none that is logical on private law conceptions.3 8  Piloty's difficulty,
like that-of many lawyers in all departments of the law, lies in relying too
greatly upon logical constructions and in assuming that legal conceptions
from generation to generation remain inflexible and rigid.
Gabba qualifies his "principle" of non-responsibility by exceptions
which practically destroy it. .After declaring the practically universally
admitted continental rule that the principle of irresponsibility does not
,apply to matters *of State contracts and property relations, including
torts committed in the operation of public utilities, leasing, concessions-
what he calls the incidental ("corporate?") rather than the natural
("governmental?") functions of the State-he recognizes responsibility
for the torts of two important classes of officials: (1) those under the
immediate direction and supervision of the Government, such as the
military and customs officers, forest guards and others of similar nature,
and (2) officers who deal with the citizen's property, such as tax collec-
tors, depositaries of public funds or merchandise, etc. The exception for
military and customs officers is explained on the ground that they are
' PILOTY, op. cit. supra note 26, 245, at 271 et seq. A somewhat similar re-
jection of practically all the theories, private and public, upon which State
responsibility has been justified, will be found in Coesters, Die Haftung des
Staates fir Amtsdelikte bei Ausibung der 6ffentlichen Gewalt nach preussischem
Rechte (1911) 5 JAHRBUcH DES OFFENTLICHEN REcHTEs, 285. An argument to
the effect that all forms of assumption of State responsibility or indemnification, .
except its responsibility as a Fiscus, rest on public law grounds, even when the
State assumes the identical duty to pay which in private law rests on the officer
(See Germat, law of 1910, Prussian law of -1909, infra and H. R. 9285, 70th
Cong. 1st Sess.) will be found in Mayer, Haftung des Staats ffir rechtwidrige
Aitshandlungen (1913) SXCHSISCHEs ARcHlV FOR RECHTSPFLEGE, 1-22.
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not really officials or else that they are so closely identified with the
State as its organs and instruments that they cannot be considered as
agents or employees-a distinction which weakens materially the alleged
principle of non-responsibility, for it would be equally applicable to police
officers, firemen, and others 'who are vested with a considerable degree of
discretion. Why they are not officials is not explained. The second ex-
ception for public depositaries is justified, as it was by Bluntschli, on the
ground that the office is trusted and not the officer.
Finally, to the frequent exception that the State is responsible for its
negligence by failing to appoint competent officers or to exercise proper
supervision, (culpa in eligendo or custodiando), a ground more theoret-
ical than practical, it has been answered that "the State" does not ap-
point or supervise, but some higher official or body, so that we are in no
stronger position to assert State responsibility than we were before. 0
Moreover, it has been said, the State is under no duty to appoint com-
petent officers and hence cannot be charged with responsibility for neg-
ligence in appointing incompdtent or inefficient officers.40
A great many of the so-called "civilians" in France and elsewhere,
those jurists who would support responsibility only on the authority of
principles of private or civil law, limit their admission of responsibility
to those cases in which the State acts as a private corporation might, that
is, in the administration of State property, the conclusion of contracts,
the operation of certain public utilities, variously designated as actes de
gestian privie, acts of the "Fiscus," administrative or "corporate" acts.
The inapplicability, in their judgment, of principles of private law to the
activities of the State as a governing institution, leads them to conclude
that there can be no State responsibility for "governmental" or "sover-
eign" acts, known as actes d'autorit6, actes de gouvernement, "puissance
publique," "Staatsakte" in the absence of special legislation according
compensation. In this view, they are joined by numerous "publicists,"
that is, specialists in public law, who find in the existence of special stat-
utes, such as those granting State indemnity for errors of criminal jus-
tice, for the establishment of State monopolies, etc., a convincing indica-
tion that in principle there is no State responsibility for injurnies inflicted
in the performance of "governmental" functions. 4' They claim that for
' SAR WY, op. cit. supra note 25, 304, LOEMNG, op. cit. supra note 23, 109.
ScHELCHFR, op. cit. supra note 20, 17, 30.
'o Richelmann, loc. cit. supra note 20, quoted in SCHEmCEr, op. cit. supra
note 20, 30.
"BGyr 'ENGENTE, op. cit. supra note 32, 25 et seq. TIRAID, op. cit. supra note
27, 69 et seq. VON BERNEGG, op. cit. supra note 31, 8 et seq. 67 et seq. The
principal French "civilists" who adopt the view of governmental irresponsibility
in the performance of "governmental" functions, are Demolombe, Cours de
Code Napoleon, (Paris, 1882) XXXI p. 553, No. 637. AUDR" ET RAU, Cours de
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fault of officers in the performance of "corporate" functions the State is
responsible, not on private law grounds, but on equitable considerations,
found in no legal text. From this premise, and from the postulate that
the State as a "governing authority" (puissance publique) is unlimited
in its liberty of action, they conclude that there can be no responsibility
for "governmental" acts. The supposed logic is as follows: "Fault,"
the only basis of responsibility admitted, implies a breach of duty. But
such duty implies a restraint on freedom of action. Now, as a "govern-
ing authority" the State's freedom of action is ex hypothesi unlimited.
Hence, the State as a "governing authority" (sovereign) cannot commit
a fault or incur responsibility.42 They add that irresponsibility for
actes d' autoritg (governmental determinations) is required in the in-
terests both of the government and of the citizens. The administration
would lose the initiative which is essential to it, if it were continually
threatened with suits for damages and the budget endangered; besides,
they assert, the individual is more interested in having the injurious
action annulled, withdrawn or repealed, than in obtaining damages.
While there may be good grounds of public policy why certain acts
of government should escape judicial accountability to individuals in-
juriously affected by them, the reasoning just suggested can hardly make
any convincing appeal or afford any serious criteria for determining
what those acts shall be. The postulates on which the deductive reason-
ing is based, such as the State's unrestrained liberty of action and the
impossibility of "sovereign" torts, can only be deemed assertions and
not arguments. The characterization of "sovereign" acts is often likely
droit civil franfais (5th ed. Paris, 1920) 387 § 447. The editor of the 5th ed., Prof.
Bartin, shows the great changes experienced by French law since the publication
of the earlier editions, note 18 bis; LAROMBIAR., op. cit. supra note 29; 20 LAU-
RENT, Principes de droit civil (Brussels, 1876) No. 418 (really a Belgian).
Among the French "publicists" who share this view are LAFmXiMR, op. cit.
supra note 27, I, 184 et seq., 680 et seq. BERTH tEmY, Traits ilimentaire de droit
administratif (10th ed. Paris, 1923) 86. The author notes the changes effected by
court decisions.
Michoud, De la responsabilit6 de l'Etat (1895) 3 REV. DE DR. PuB. 401.
Though a writer on public law, Michoud is usually classified as a "civilian,"
because he admits the application of the civil code to the State for all acts of
gestion.' DARESTE, La justice administrative en France (2d ed. 1914) 525 et seq.
1 Aucoc, Conferences sur l'administration (3d ed. 1885) §288. BRtmoND,
Traits . . . de la competence administrative (Paris, 1894) § 1507. ROGER, De la
responsabiliti de 'Etat (Paris, 1900) 42. The principal German "civilists,"
before the enactment of the civil code, are Dernburg, F6rster, Cosack, Ende-
mann. The principal German "publicists" are Bluntschli, Loening, Sarwey,
Piloty, Jellinek, Rehm. The principal Italian civilists are Gabba, Giorgi (op.
cit. note 24, Obbligazioni V, 556 et seq.). The principal Italian publicists are
Meucci, Orlando, Siciliani, Forti. The unwillingness to admit the applicability
of civil law principles has led some writers to deny that the State is responsible
at all in tort, and others to assert that it is responsible on principles of public
law only. See infra, p. 615, and note 99.
' This is somewhat analogous to the reasoning of Mr. Justice Holmes in the
"Western Maid." 257 U. S. 419, 433, 42 Sup. Ct. 159 (1922) ; (1927) 36 YALE, L. J.
794.
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to be a premise or label, mistaken for a reasoned conclusion, purporting
to justify irresponsibility.
Duguit'had the support of a growing line of decisions when he dis-
puted the validity of the time-honored distinction between non-sovereign
"corporate" (gestion) and sovereign "governmental" (autorit) acts,
and when he contended that the mysterious concept of "sovereignty,"
supposedly inconsistent with responsibility, had to be exposed and dis-
sipated. He therefore undertook to unmask the illusions and metaphysics
of sovereignty, and by substituting for it the idea of "public service,"
he has deprived the theory of irresponsibility of one of its staunchest
supports.43 No longer overwhelmed and disarmed by the mesmeric word
"sovereignty," the problem can be approached in the cold light of reason
and social expediency to determine how far the State or political group
ought under given circumstances to assume responsibility for injuries
sustained at the hands of the official machine.
While it was once thought that there was some clearly distinguished
line of division between administrative or "corporate" acts, on the one
hand, and "governmental" or sovereign acts, on the other hand, which
could make this classification useful, time has shown that the dividing
line varies not only from country to country, but shifts from decade to
decade in the same country. Not only has there been a uniform move-
ment of the line in the direction of an enlargement of the category of
"corporate" acts and a narrowing of the field of "governmental" acts,
minimizing the intrinsic value of the classification, but the belief that
there was an inherent non-responsibility for "governmental" acts has
been shattered by the development of legislation and court decisions. 44
The movement has gone so far as to suggest that there is no essential
difference in principle or theory between injuries inflicted wrongfully
and those inflicted rightfully in exercise of the police power.46  It must
also be recorded that many writers, like Loening and others, following
the view of the French Council of State in the Blanco case46 assert that
it is impossible to predicate non-responsibility or responsibility on any
' Duguit, The concept of public service (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 425, 433; LAW
IN THE MODERN STATE (1919) ch. II, VII. (Laski's translation of Duguit's, Les
transformations de droit public); Traiti de droit constitutionnel (2d ed. 1923)
III, §§ 81-83. We may support this result, without fully subscribing to Duguit's
belief in the entire uselessness or obsolescence of the concept "sovereignty." Cf.(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 760 et seq.
"FAIR, op. cit. supra note 32, 88 et seq. 117 et seq. DUGIT, LAW IN
MODERN STATE (1919) ch. II, VII. VON BERNEGG, op. cit. supra note 31, 15 et
seq. ROGER, op. cit. supra note 41, 14.
VON BERNEGG, 97 et seq.(1873) Sirey, 1873, 2, 153. On this decision see DUGUT, LAW IN THE
MODERN STATE (1919) 156.
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT 591
general or absolute rule, but that the issue must be determined on the
special facts of each case with a view to harmonizing the interests of the
State with the interests of the injured individual.47 All this will be more
fully discussed hereafter. For the present, we are primarily interested in
examining the theories on which non-responsibility or responsibility has
been maintained.
THEORIES OF RESPONSIBILITY
The classification of the theories of State responsibility may be made
on the basis (a) of the grounds on which responsibility is predicated or
(b) of the extent to which it is admitted. So far as concerns the latter
class, there are those who have admitted State responsibility for the tor-
tious acts of all officers, whether superior or inferior in rank, whether
judicial or administrative, whether arising out of fraud, wilful act or
negligence, whether acting in "corporate" or "governmental" matters.
Most of the writers, the legislatures and the courts, however, have im-
posed qualifications on the generality of these admissions. Some approve
a primary responsibility of the State, others only a subsidiary liability,
after the vain exhaustion of remedies against the officers. Some uphold
a general primary responsibility, others only a limited responsibility,
others still a general subsidiary responsibility.48 The examination of
these classifications of the extent of responsibility we shall reserve until
we come to study the incidence of responsibility as between State and
officer in the positive law of various countries.
We are now interested in an examination of the scientific and doc-
trinal explanations which have been advanced in support of the respon-
sibility. of the State.
The older theories of State responsibility, expounded by jurists be-
fore the nineteenth century, rested largely on a supposed State negligence
in selecting or supervising the wrongdoing officer (culpa in eligendo or
'
7 In general, this closely approximates the view of LOENING, op. cit. supra
note 23, 109, 110; ScHELCHER, op. cit. supra note 20, 33-36. Loening claimed (1879)
that State responsibility could not be predicated on any particular legal theory or
even on principles of justice. In general, therefore, he opposed responsibility.
He was willing to make certain concessions to responsibility where the citizen
was forced to enter into relations with certain officials, particularly in the con-
clusion of public contracts and deposit of money in court. See the views of the
school that denfes the validity of any single principle in GIORGI, op. cit. supra
note 24 (Obbligazioni) 553.
'The views of German writers of the nineteenth century are partly classified,
according to the extent of responsibility admitted, by PILOTY, op. Cit. supra note
26, 245, 249 et seq. See also Dock, loc. cit. supra note 22, 248. The several views
are also set out, with citations, in the works of GIORMI and of CHIRONI, op. cit.
supra notes 24 and 19, at pages cited.
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custodienda). This, for the most part, was usually a pure fiction and
the nineteenth century practically abandoned it.49
Again, the Roman niandatum was relied upon. But, like most of
the isolated texts and institutions that have been invoked from the Roman
law, the theory of inandatun, the nearest approach to the modern no-
tion of agency, was of extremely limited application, even in contract,
and in the matter of torts, it could be invoked only by tenuous analogy
to justify the doctrine of respondeat superior.50
The very term "responsibility of the State" has been subjected to
challenge. "Responsibility," it is alleged, 5' arose out of civil law con-
ceptions implying a competent and cognizant wrongdoer, wrongful act,
and a penalty. The State, it is said, does not meet these tests. As an
entity, it rarely orders a wrongful act; the private law tests of tort may
apply to individuals, including officers, but only by doubtful analogy can
they be imputed to the State; and the only penalty possible is money
damages, not specific performance or fine. Even the limited suability
admitted in eminent domain, in contract, in property relations, consti-
tutes, it is claimed, no evidence in principle contradicting absolute sov-
ereignty and hence irresponsibility.
If responsibility is based solely on some wrongful or erroneous or even
injurious act causing damage, as private law assumes, then the term
"responsibility" can be ascribed to the State only within narrow limits.
In fact, the modern State has by statute or decision assumed responsi-
bility for damages sustained in innumerable ways-through the acts of
mobs, through erroneous criminal convictions and arrests, through war,
through the defective condition of roads and streets, through the unex-
pected collapse of walls, through the accidental explosion of shells left
in the field, through artillery fire across one's land, through the suppres-
sion of private industry on behalf of a State monopoly and through all
"The works and theories of the older writers on our subject, such as Paulus
de Castro (d. 1441), Ludovicus Romanus (1409-1439), Hieronymus Schiirpf(1481-1554), Nikolaus Myler von Ehrenbach (1678), SAMUEL STRvic, De obliga-
Hone principis ex facto ministri (1682), Nikolaus Hert (1709), J. P. Kress(1732), von Kreittmayer (1756), J. F. W. de Neumann (1751), together with
numerous court decisions of the period are reviewed by LOENING, op. cit. supra
note 23, 38 et seq., by Zachariae, loc. cit. supra note 10, 591 et seq. and by F.
Mecacci in (1877) 2 FoRo ITALIANo, 78 et seq. Heffter and a few others still ad-
mitted a responsibility for negligent selection or supervision. The objection is not
to the ground itself, but to its truth in fact.
Yet the French Council of State recently held that where a soldier quartered
in a house, while in a fit of drunkenness killed a child, the implied "absence of
supervision" imposed responsibility on the State. Lhuillier, Nov. 14, 1919, Leb.
819, 38 REV. DR. PuB. 345.
'On mandatum and liability for third parties in Roman law, see BUCKLAND,
ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF THE ROMAN PRIVATE LAW (1912) 281, 325, 327. See
also (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 4 et seq.
MASTEAU, La responsabiliti de 'Etat (Paris, 1927) 3. See also FAUcoNET,
La responsabilitM, tAtude de sociologie (Paris, 1920) 11.
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forms of eminent domain-cases in which a wrongful act attributable
to the State would be difficult to identify. Hence the suggestion that the
term "responsibility," when applied to the State, is a misnomer, for the
principles and facts out of which arises the payment of compensation
differ materially from our conceptions of private law responsibility. The
term "indemnification" might be preferable, when describing those com-
pensations made by statute or decision under circumstances implying no
wrongful or erroneous act, or where "fault" is invoked as a fiction merely
to furnish a basis for assessing damages. Yet the connotations of the
term "responsibility" have been broadened, perhaps in imitation of its
private law extension, to* cover not only the traditional concept, but also
cases of indemnification without fault. The great variety of circum-
stances giving rise to successful claims for compensation, ranging from
an official tort to the purest accident, demonstrates that no single legal
theory can sustain all the cases, however general the underlying philoso-
phy. The extension of State responsibility in France and Germany has
induced the proposal of new theories, notably that of "social risk," with-
out necessarily causing an abandonment of the older theories based on
"fault."
The early juristic obstacles to the assignment of fault to corpora-
tions and hence to the State have long since been overcome, and notwith-
standing Duguit's assertion that the State is merely a collection of public
services and not a corporation, legislatures and courts are daily assessing
damages against it as an entity. Yet by reason of its very nature, its
responsibility cannot always be determined and measured by the identical
rules governing the activities of individuals and private corporations.
While in some respects, it assumes by statute a greater responsibility
than would rest on individuals or private corporations, as in the case of
mob violence, injuries sustained on public roads, and through errors of
criminal justice, it incurs on the whole a responsibility less and different
than do the subjects of private law. In legislative and judicial functions,
it escapes responsibility for injury to the individual, unless it expressly
assumes it, and this it rarely does. In administrative matters, while
possessing prerogatives not claimable by private individuals or corpor-
ations, its responsibility is growing ever greater-not necessarily, how-
ever, by extension of the rules of "private law but, as in France, by the
decisions of administrative courts creating or applying principles of so-
called public law, which again place the State under a legal r6gime dif-
fering from that governing private individuals or corporations. How
much difference in actual result the two systems display may be open to
question, for in Germany a system operating with the conceptions of
the civil code has had no difficulty in working out responsibility for the
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torts of officers. So in England and the United States, where pending
legislative reforms contemplate the assumption of State responsibility
for wrongful acts or omissions of officers acting within the scope of their
employment, there would seem to be little difficulty in transferring from
the officer to the State those conceptions of tort responsibility which have
long governed the relations between officers and private citizens. In-
asmuch as these countries are not proposing any wide assumption of re-
sponsibility for accidents or for injuries inflicted under the police power,
the European theories of responsibility in cases not involving the torts
of officers, will be recognized as included in this study for scientific com-
pleteness only.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN "GOVERNMENTAL" AND "CORPORATE"
FUNCTIONS
Before entering upon an examination of the theories of responsi-
bility, it seems necessary to note the distinction made in most of the
countries of Europe between the "governmental" and the "corporate"
functions of the State. The history and theory of public responsibility,
as in the case of our municipal corporation, are closely identified with
this distinction. 'It was deemed indispensable, because of the historical
identification of "sovereignty" with irresponsibility and because of the
growing recognition that in. some cases the State, continually broadening
its activities, must assume responsibility for the torts of its officers. Em-
phasis upon the distinction was encouraged by the desire to widen the
scope of responsibility and to restrict the field of irresponsibility. It
was fostered by jurisdictional considerations, such as the theory that only
the State as a "corporation" could be made judicially responsible, that
the rules of the civil law could be applied only to a "corporation" or else,
as in Belgium, that there was no court which could assume jurisdiction
over acts performed in the exercise of "governmental" functions. That
the distinction has either broken down or lost much of its importance, in
countries like France and Germany, is due to the fact either that legisla-
tion has opened to the citizen a right of action in tort even in "govern-
mental" matters, as in Germany, or else that the administrative courts,
as in France, have modified their conception of the "corporate" function
of the State or have found it inexpedient to maintain a distinction which
had become artificial and academic. The French courts, in fact, by ex-
tending responsibility into fields theretofore deemed exclusively "gov-
ernmental," as in the case of acts of police, and by continually enlarging
the domain of "corporate" or "proprietary" acts, have undermined both
the purpose and the grounds of the distinction. It has, however, a great
historical interest and still has in many countries a very practical impor-
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tance. It must be remembered that it was invented by jurists largely for
the purpose of limiting the irresponsibility attached to the so-called
"sovereign" activity of the State.
From the days of the Roman law the continental jurist had been
familiar with the conception of the Roman Empire or State in its
property or pecuniary relations. 52 The postglossators emphasized the
distinction between the Respublica and the Fiscus, between the State
in its governmental and in its property relations, between imperium and
dominiumY3 While there is much historical dispute as to whether the
fiscus was a corporation in Roman law and thus deemed a subject of
law, and if not, when the fiscus concept was received in continental
jurisprudence as a corporation, suing and suable as such, there is no
doubt that by the nineteenth century, with the complete separation of
the State's imperium-from its dominium, the doctrine was fully accepted.
The doctrine of State, property arose in the European towns of the
Middle Ages, when the Holy Roman Empire had begun to decay. They
combined the facts of their corporate life with the texts of the Roman
law relating to the Fiscus, and thus developed a conception which was
later applied, like the doctrine of the corporation itself, to the Germanic
territorial State . 4 The confusion and uncertainty during the Middle
Ages was due to the fact that the feudal lords were deemed sovereigns
as well as proprietors and carried their regal prerogatives throughout
all their functions, a position which survived the growth of the doctrines
of monarchy and of sovereignty. It was only when the separation of
imperiun and dominium was again insisted upon by the publicists of
the school of natural law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
that we had a renewed recognition of the differentiation of functions in
the State into "corporate" and "governmental." The suability and re-
" Digest XLIX, 14, 3, 6, De jure fisci. See on the Roman law development of
the Fiscus and the discussion as to whether it was then deemed a juristic person.
HATSCHEK, Die rechtliche Stellung des Fiskus (Berlin, 1899) 24 et seq., and 3
GIERIE, Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht (1887) 60 et seq. 1 Mrrmxs, op. cit. supra
note 15, 348 et seq.; 2 MOmmSEN, op. cit. supra note 15, 998; BucrLAND, A TExT-
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW (1921) 176 et seq.; VASSALLI, Concetto e natura del fisco
(from STUDI SExESI, v. 25, Turin, 1908) 27 et seq. and the excellent review by
Kosehaker in (1911) 32 ZTSCHR. DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG, Rom. ABR., 407 et seq.
Jones, The early history of the Fiscus (1927) 43 L. Q. REv. 499 et seq. Vino-
gradoff in (1924) 12 CALIF. L. REV. 443. On the origin of the Roman fiscus as
the personal treasury of the Emperor, and its confusion with the public aerarium,
see SERRIGNY, op. cit. supra note 4, 96 et seq. 2 ibid. 1 et seq.
WOOLF, BARTOLUS OF SASSOFERRATO (1913) 119-122. HATScHEK, op. cit. supra
note 52, 26. The medieval development of the Fiscus in the Frankish Kingdom
and the Leges Barbarorum is well described by Jones, loc. cit. supra note 52,
504 et seq. and by VASSALLI, op. cit. supra note 52.
" The history of the Fiscus conception and its development in continental
law is treated, in addition to Hatschek, by 1 MAYER, Deutsches Verwaltungs
recht, (3d ed. 1924), 49 et seq. RICHTER, Der Reichsfiskus, (Tubingen, 1908)
3 et seq. 3 GIERKE, Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht, 54 et seq. by Jones, loc. cit.
supra note 52, 499, and VASSALLI, op. cit. supra note 52.
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sponsibility of the State in Central Europe developed along lines quite
different from those prevailing in England, and more nearly analogous to
those with which we have become familiar in the American law of
municipal corporations. In France, the conception of Fiscus was sub-
merged by the wider concept of State property (domaine priv and
public.)55 Yet the legal result was not far different in subjecting pub-
licly owned property to the legal relations customary for private prop-
erty and in subjecting the State in its function as a business entrepreneur
to rules of law analogous to those which governed other corporations;
although in the operation of the public service (gestion publique) the
French administrative courts reached the result by the application of
rules of what was called "public law."
The content of the concept Fiscus has varied and is not now certain.
In imperial Rome, it was a term designating the Emperor's and then
the State Treasury. In modern Europe, it wasi extended to cover the
Treasury and fiscal relations of the State and its "private" and "public"
property-such a distinction having developed-and the State when
exercising "corporate" functions. It is thus but one aspect of the State
and of other public corporations as well. It involves in a general way the
administration of the Treasury, including tax collections, money deposits
with official bodies, including courts, custom houses and other deposi-
tories; the operation of railroads, forests, mines, and postal telegraph
services and public utilities in general, including business enterprises
such as the tobacco, match, liquor, porcelain and other monopolies;
and the ownership and management of publicly owned land, buildings
and other physical property s0
Doubts have arisen, for jurisdictional purposes-when the State
undertakes administrative acts with public property--whether the fiscal
or the administrative feature predominates. Europeans have had as much
difficulty in delimiting the exact boundaries of the State or city as a
Fiscus as we have had in determining the "corporate" functions of our
municipalities. In France, the distinction between acts of gestion privee,
the management of public projerty, and gestion publique, of public
services, was not always clear, the former, like the Fiscus in Germany,
being subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts and the rules of civil
law, 5 7 the latter to the administrative courts and so-called rules of public
r The distinction between the "public" and the "private" property of the
State is well established in France, though it is not logically carried out. The
"private" property is alienable, though not the "public" property. See CIVIL CODE,
Arts. 537 et seq. HAsrSCHEK, op. ct. supra note 52, 36 et seq.
' Primker in the Ninth DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG (1870) III, p. 28 lists some
of the enterprises and activities included in the conception of Fiscus.
"
7BIGoT D'ENGENTE, op. cit. supra note 32, 12. HAURIOU, Pr/cis de droit
administratif et de droit public (9th ed. Paris, 1919) 67, 70 (La gestion priv;e).
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT 597
law developed by them. The main distinction lay in the fact that in
gestion privge the State is deemed a corporation of private law, in gestion
publique, of public law, a distinction which since 1873; has determined
the jurisdiction, respectively, of the ordinary courts and of the admin-
istrative courts. In both, however, the doctrine of respondeat superior
is applied to the State and minor public corporations, though the admin-
istrative courts have advanced beyond this technical position.
By articles 31 and 89 of the German Civil Code the State and other
public corporations acting in their "corporate" (Fiscus) or private law
capacity-designated as the Railroad Fiscus, the Postal Fiscus, etc.,-
are responsible, like any private corporation, for tortious injuries in-
flicted upon third persons by their constitutional or directing offiials
acting within the scope of their official duties. Their acts are deemed
acts of the corporation itself. For the acts of minor employees and
agents, the Fiscus assumes responsibility under sections 831 and 278
of the code, which enables the State acting and sued as a Fiscus, to
escape responsibility by proving that it was guilty of no fault in select-
ing or supervising the employee or supplying equipment or that the
injury would have happened regardless of the State's blamelessness in
these respects. Strangely, in "governmental" matters, a wider public
responsibility has been imposed by a statute of 1909 in Prussia and by
a statute of 1910 and by article 131 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919
in the Reich.
The courts of France reach somewhat the same conclusion-though
a more unqualified responsibility in "corporate" matters-either by the
application of articles 1382 and 1384 of the Civil Code making a "per-
son" responsible for his own torts and a master for those of his em-
ployees 8 or by the application of a somewhat analogous principle of
so-called "public law." In "corporate" functions of the State, many
countries of Europe and Latin-America follow the French practice.
' Article 1382: "Any act by which a person causes damage to another binds
the person by whose fault the damage occurred to repair it."
Article 1384: "A person is responsible not only for the damage which he
causes by his personal acts, but also for the damage caused by the acts of persons
for whom he is responsible." The Belgian, Italian and Roumanian codes contain
identical provisions. Cf. ROGER, op. cit. supra note 41, 29-32.
TrRARD, op. cit. supra note 27, 15 et seq. The State, in its acts of gestion
publique is' deemed to act as a private person or corporation might in the manage-
ment of his property. BERTHtLEMY, op. cit. supra note 41 (10th ed. 1923) 87;
Michoud, loc. cit. supra note 41, 14. BAILBY, De la responsabilitg de l'Etat envers
les particuliers (Bordeaux, 1901) 50, .78.
Somewhat similar provisions are to be found in the Swiss Codes: Art. 55
of the CIVIL CODE makes the public corporation responsible, when it enters into
private law relations, for the acts of its "organs"; article 61 of the CODE OF
OBLIGATIONS (1911) imposes the same duty when the officer is engaged in private
or "industrial" matters (gewerbliche Verrichtungen).
VON BERNEGG, op. cit. supra note 31, 70.
ScHijrz, op. cit. supra note 10, 20, who states that these articles impose no
responsibility for "governmental" acts. vON BERNEGG (p. 70) agrees. But cf.
1 RosSEL Er MENTIHA, Mamuel dit droit civil suisse (2d ed. 1922) 118.
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The French law, under the ancien regime, and down through the
eighteenth century, dominated by notions of royal and sovereign infal-
libility and unaccountability, found much difficulty in conceiving of any
legal theory of public responsibility. 0 After the French Revolution,
which merely transferred sovereignty to the people, came certain definite
innovations, namely, the creation of the Council of State with adminis-
trative control over the administrative hierarchy, the recognition of pri-
vate rights of the individual against the group, the enactment of statutes
making the State judicially responsible for injuries inflicted in the con-
struction and operation of public works. These developments induced
jurists and courts, notwithstanding the doctrine of separation of powers,
to develop a theory and a practice protecting the individual against in-
vasion of his rights by the administration. Influenced by the tradition
of irresponsibility, public acts, apart from legislation and judicial de-
cisions, were divided into two great groups, the acres de gouvcrnement
(Government) and actes d'administration (administration)-a clas-
sification to which, after a long and circuitous evolution, legal theory
now seems to have recurred. In the former category, which has varied in
content, were included political acts which escape judicial review looking
to damages, such as high executive acts, diplomatic functions, acts to
promote the public safety, acts of war, etc. ° For "reasons of State"
it is said, these acts, the criterion of which is political rather than legal,
should not admit of an action for damages on the part of those who may
be injured by them, unless special legislation permits. 61
0JACQUELIN, La juridiction administrative dans le droit constitutionnel(Paris, 1891) 95 et seq. 122 et seq. LAFEIAPE, op. cit. supra note 27, 139 et seq.
CouzlNETr, op. cit. supra note 4, 48 et seq.
ILE CouRToiS, Thgorie des actes de gouvernement (Paris, 1899). Br6mond,
Des actes de gonverneinent (1896) 5 REv. DE DRorr PUBLIC, 23 et seq. (1893)
22 REv. CRIIQUE (N. s.) 321. 2 LAFERRIkRE, op. cit supra note 27, 33. CoUzlNm,
op. cit. supra note 4, 34, 83 et seq. Trotobas, Les actes de gouvernement en
,nati~re diploinatlique, (1925) 45 REVuE CRITIQUE, (N. s.) 342. Bosc, Les actes
de gouvernementt et la thgorie des pouvoirs de guerre (1926) 42 REv. D E DRoiT
PUBLIC, 186. DuEz, La responsabilitM de la puissance publique, (Paris, 1927)
113 et seq. APPLEroN, Traitj Inentaire du contentieux administratif, (Paris,
1927) 287 et seq.
Actually, no acceptable criterion to establish "acts of government" has been
devised. The old criterion of "political aim" has been replaced by "nature of
the act," too vague a clue for utility, so that enumeration has become the practice
of courts and jurists. The distinction between "acts of government" and "acts
of administration" is political. 2 DUGUIT, TraitM de droit constitutionnel (2d ed.
Paris, 1923) 245, 3 ibid. 695. For a list of "acts of government" see HAURIOU,
Pricis de droit administratif (10th ed. 1921) 433. APPLETON, op. cit. 290-300.
61 Such legislation exists in the matter of judicial errors, for the statutory
suppression of certain businesses, and in other respects to be noted hereafter.
The classification is not exact, and the fact is that for numerous acts of the
highest executive officers and for the acts of diplomats, such as improper re-
fusal of a vis6, an action lies.
Several writers contend that these so-called "actes de gouvernement" are
merely a class of administrative acts, for which it seems wise not to permit
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Acts of administration include all other executive or administrative
acts, and are divided according to the classic distinction of the nine-
teenth century, into actes d' autoritg and actes de gestion. The distinc-
tion goes back to Merlin and Locr6, who protested the suggestion that
contracts made by the Government could not be challenged before the
regular courts.62 They proposed the two categories of administrative
acts, acts of authority (autoritg) and management (gestion). The
former, down to recent times, were described as acts of command, of
decision, which give rise to no action for damages ;63 the latter, the exe-
judicial review to collect damages, and that there is in theory no such category.
ee JACQUELIN, Principes dominants du contentieux administratif (Paris, 1899)
297 et seq. BERTHfLEmY, op. cit. supra note 41, (10th ed.) 115, 117. CouzrXET, op.
cit. supra note 4, 35 et seq.
DuEz, op. cit. supra note 60, 115. SouRDois, De l'ivoletion . . . de la re-
sponsabilitg de l'Etat (Paris, 1908) 117 et seq.
'LocRj, Legislation et jurisprudence franiais (1810). MEaLIN, Questions
de droit T7° Pouvoir judiciaire (1829) as cited by COT, La responsabilitg civile
des fonctionnaires publics (Paris, 1922) 233, and DUGuIT, LAW IN THE MODERN
STATE (1919) 137.
The distinction between the State as a "civil person" and a "public power,"i.e., as a corporation and a sovereign has been ascribed to the separation, at the
time of the French Revolution, between the property of the State and of the
sovereign personally, on the one hand, and between the notions of property
(dominion) and sovereignty (imperium) on the other. VAUTHIER, t8tudes sur
les personnes morales (Bruxelles, 1887) 305. In fact, the distinction goes back
to the postglossators and the European towns of the Middle Ages.
' BERTHALEMY, op. cit. supra note 41, 85-88, is one of the few who adhere
to the classic distinction. BuLLRIcH, La responsabilidad del estado (Buenos Aires,
1920) c. 2. See MIcHOUD, Thgorie de la personnaliti morale (2d ed. 1924) 280
et seq. 3 GIORGI, La dottrina delle persone giuridiche (2d ed. Florence, 1900)
159 et seq. That there may be a conceptual distinction between the two classes of
acts or functions need hardly be denied. Innumerable writers, standing on the sup-
posed classical distinction between private law and public law, have undertaken
to classify the acts and functions of the State or State agents as acts of "private
law" (jure gestionis) or acts of "public law" (jure imperii). See the Writers
cited by Michoud in (1895) 4 REv. DE DROIT PUBLIC, 24 et seq. Their conclusions
as to legal consequence and supporting theory are based on this classification.
The difficulty lies in the application of the classification to specific acts. The marked
variation of opinion in this respect gives rise to doubts as to the validity or utility
of the traditional division of governmental acts. The division in principle is
maintained in Germany, though by statute the difference in legal consequence
has been largely removed. In France, the administrative courts and writers have
challenged the validity of the distinction both in the abstract and in application.
The validity of the distinction was first successfully attacked by Commis-
sioner Teissier in the Feutry case, Feb. 29, 1908, Lebon, 208; cf. Duez in (1924)
44 REVUE CRITIQUE (N. S.) 338, It had been challenged. in 1905 in the Grecco
case, Sirey 1905, III, 113. In the Thrond case, March 4, 1910, Lebon, 197, it was
pronounced by Commissioner Pichat as "abandoned." Cf. Garner, French
administrative law (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 597, at 619.
In Belgium and Italy, the distinction is still of fundamental importance,
though its application has not always been consistent. In Belgium, an accentu-
ated devotion to the doctrine of separation of powers has prevented, except for
statute, any imputation of responsibility to the State when acting in a "govern-
mental" (puissance publique) capacity. MARCQ, op. cit. supra note 3, 229 et seq.
BouRQurN, La Protection des droits individuels contre les abus de pouvoir
(Bruxelles, 1912) 253 et seq. WODON, Le controle juridictionnel de l'administra-
tion (Bruxelles, 1920) 71 et seq. An exception is made in the matter of state
invasion of rights of real property by the operation of public works or roads.
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cution of such acts by administrative officers, which may entail respon-
sibility.64 The former, in a broad sense, then usually characterized as
acts of public power (puissance publique) would include legislation and
decisions of courts and of administrative commissions, the execution of
the laws, police and judicial acts, or such "governmental" acts as a
private person could not perform; the latter, such "corporate" acts of
management or administration as a private person might perform, e.g.,
the management of public property, the making of ordinary contracts,
and engaging in State commercial enterprises. This was known as
gestion prive, 6 5 as distinguished from the operation of public services
such as health and fire protection, railroad operation, gas, water and
electric supply, known as gestion publique.
The endeavor to work out these classifications resulted in nearly as
many artificial distinctions as the efforts of the American courts to dis-
Whether the trespass was wrongful or rightful seems to be immaterial, as well
as the issue whether domaine privg or puissance publique is involved. MARCQ,
op. cit. supra note 3, 111, 260 et seq. 2 MICHouD, Thgorie de la personnalite
morale, (2d ed. Paris, 1924) 258 et seq. For the Italian view of the distinction,
see RANELETrI, op. cit. supra note 34, and GIORGI, op. cit. supra note 24 (ob-
bligazioni) 166 et seq.
Duguit never admitted the validity of the classical distinction, but proposed
a distinction between contractual administrative acts and noncontractual (unilat-
eral) administrative acts. LAw IN THE MODERN STATE, C. V.
Numerous writers point out the impossibility of separating clearly the act
of gestion from that of puissance publique. The governmental authority (pis-
sance publique) is a factor in all State acts, but is not believed sufficient to enable
the State to escape subjection to the ordinary rules of law in cases which have
been labelled gestion. MARcQ, op. cit. 312; HAuRIou, op. cit. supra note 57 (9th
ed.) 518 et seq. CxnoNx, op. cit. supra note 19, 505, 515 et seq.
CoUzINEr, op. cit. supra note 4, 97 et seq. CoT, op. cit. supra note 62, 234
et seq. 0
. Even the school of jurists who explain State responsibility on public law
grounds alone, and deny responsibility for "governmental" acts (puissance
publique) admit responsibility for "corporate" acts of gestion, involving the
fault or error of officers in the public service, but justify it not on private law
grounds (except for proprietary actes de doiaine privi), but on grounds of
general equity. 1 LAFERmARE, op. cit. supra note 27, 184, 680 et seq.
IDuEz, La thiorie de la gestion privie (1924) 44 REVUE CRi uE (N. s.) 337.
The division for jurisdictional purposes between gestion privee and gestion publique
is logical. The former come before the ordinary courts, applying the rules of
the civil code, the latter before the administrative courts, applying rules of
public law. The difficulty arises in applying the distinction between gestion
privie and publique to actual cases, DuEz, op. cit., 340 ff. Contracts entered into
by the public service fall sometimes into one, sometimes into the other class.
Uz, 342, discusses some of the criteria of the distinction.
The suggestion of BERTHLLEmY, op. cit. supra note 41, 87, that in both types
of gestion the State (or political subdivision or establishment) acts as a private
person, seems a little difficult to support. At least, Berth~lemy seems now the
only distinguished authority to' espouse this view, though Michoud once shared
it with him. Indeed, the analogy of the "private person" has in France been
applied by the courts as a test of gestion privde, thus openly admitting the inap-
plicability of the test to gestion publique. But in Belgium, gestion prive,
involving the "private person" analogy, is about the only type of activity that has
engaged the responsibility of the State, apart from the management of State
property and invasions of private real property by the operation of public works
and roads. ,MARcQ, op. cit. supra note 3, 244 et seq.
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tinguish "governmental" from "corporate" acts of municipalities. The
method of making the State responsible for actes de gestion was con-
ceptually to erect the State (or political subdivision) into a public
"corporation" or "person," and thus to apply to it the civil law doctrines
of agency and of "fault"-responsible either for its "own" faults under
article 1382 of the Code or vicariously for those of its employees under
article 1384. Possibly this result was aided by the fact that statutes of
1790, 1807 and 1836 had made the State responsible for injuries inflicted
in the execution and operation of public works, a responsibility for
which culpability or fault had not been required by the courts.66 But
when the State acted in a "governmental" capacity, (d' autorit or as
a puissance publique), it was not a "corporation," and its officer not an
agent; it was a sovereign incapable of "fault." Thus, the same officer
might perhaps simultaneously perform a "corporate" and "govern-
mental" act, and be and not be an agent. Moreover, while an acte d'
autorit could be challenged and annulled for excess or abuse of power,
and thus be subject to judicial control, it could not give rise to an in-
demnity.67
'c CouzlNET, op. cit. supra note 4, 129, n. 1, 3 DUGUIT, Traitj de dr. const.
(2d ed. 1923) § 82. Damage to private property occasioned by the execution
of public works may be deemed a branch of eminent domain. In this matter the
courts have made a distinction. If the State erects a building or does any other
act that an individual might, invoking no exceptional rights, it is responsible like
an individual for fault only; but if the 'ublic work is so important or unusual
that ati individual could not carry it out, and if exceptional public powers are
invoked, such as operating the public highways, building railroads or canals,
constructing tunnels, etc., the State is responsible, even without fault, for the
damages it inflicts, whether because of a defective plan or official negligence or
other reason. HAURIOu, op. cit. supra note 57 (9th ed.), 543 et seq. 2 Aucoc, op.
cit. supra note 41 (2d ed.) 156 et seq. 2 DucRocgq, Cours de droit administratif(7th ed. 1897) 590. MARCQ, op. cit supra note 3, 322.
'BETHtiLEMY, op. cit. supra note 41, 87 et seq. seems to adhere to this
"logical" system, notwithstanding that the courts have abandoned it. He main-
tains that the State is not responsible for actes d'autoritg, because it is not a
corporation but a sovereign, and that it is responsible for actes de gestion, under
article 1384 C. C., as a corporation.
PIcoi, op. cit. supra note 3, 108-127, outlines the classifications of adminis-
trative acts proposed by numerous publicists. Some, like Michoud, (in 1895)
admitted the "dual personality" theory; others denied it. All admitted a category
of acts of sovereignty (puissance publique) and of management (gestiont). .La-
ferri~re subdivided the latter into publique and privie. But they never agreed
upon the criteria of classification, whether nature of the act or character of the
officer or some other test. Michoud sagaciously affirmed that there was no
criterion to distinguish a priori the two great classes. The Council of State
made classifications empirically, without stating any tests. It began to be ad-
mitted that any public service might involve acts of both or either type, sovereign("governmental") or non-sovereign ("corporate"). So the seizure of property
for police purposes might be an act d'autorit, but its detention, like a deposit,
would be an act de gestion. Such possibilities are known to our law [Building
sewer governmental failure to remove obstruction corporate.] Judd v. Hartford,
72 Conn. 350, 44 Atl. 510 (1899) ; Perrotti v. Bennett, 94 Conn. 533, 109 Atl. 890
(1920). Doddridge, Distinction between governmental and proprietary functions
of municipal corporations (1925) 23 MicH. L. REv. 325. The effort to distingnish
gestion publique from gestion privie, created for jurisdictional purposes, proved
equally futile and the results elusive, except that substantive responsibility was
a consequence in both forums, administrative and judicial, respectively. Lafer-
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A system so artificial was bound to break down. While the "pri-
vate person" analogy may well apply to the State as a property-owner or
manufacturer, contractor and merchant, (gestion priv6e) and thus jus-
tify the application of the rules of private law in the ordinary courts, it
could hardly apply fully to the State as the administrator of the public
services (gestion publique). The Council of State assumed jurisdiction
over injuries inflicted in the conduct of the public services, and awarded
damages not, it was said, under the rules of the Civil Code but on prin-
ciples of public law, which in practice, however, resulted in compensa-
tion by the State for the acts of its officials. The division of jurisdiction
helped to undermine the classical distinctions. The State "corporation"
was an invention of the jurists. If it was a "corporation" for managing
the railroads or giving fire protection, why was it not a corporation in
extending police protection? The alleged distinction between the "gov-
ernmental" State and the "corporate" State was by many jurists ridi-
culed.68 The fatuity of erecting the State into a corporation to make it
responsible, and in another case denying responsibility because it was
not a corporation did not escape notice. The State, like a municipality,
never acts in its private interests, but always for the public, and it is
always the same State or municipality, whatever public function it per-
forms, a fact by no means fully appreciated by many American courts
dealing with municipal responsibility.69
The weakness of the traditioual classification in France was dis-
closed by the fact that the Tribunal of Conflicts and the Couhcil of
State, not bound by any code, began to extend the category of "public
services" (gestion publique) so as to include acts of police and other
functions theretofore assigned to the field of acts of autoritM or puissance
publique, and to narrow the class of acts of gestion priv~e, over which
the ordinary courts exercised jurisdiction.70 Thereafter the distinction
rire's proposal to confine the class of acts of gestion priv~e to the administration
of State property and the railroads has not been successful. The whole effort
at classification represents an attempt to find some scientific method of dis-
tinguishing acts for which the State is not responsible from those for which it
is. As the Council of State has gradually extended responsibility to acts of
police and similar acts formerly deemed to be privileged as within the State's
"sovereign" functions (puissance publique or autorite), the old classifications
and the supposed tests that distinguished them had of necessity to be abandoned.
"WooN, op. cit. supra note 63, 129 et seq. CHioNI, op. cit. supra note 19
(Colpa contrattuale) 501, 515 et seq.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 129, 130 et seq.
"TEissinR, op. cit. supra note 23, 172 et seq. Hauriou in his critical note to
the Lepreux case, Jan. 13, 1899, Sirey, 1900, III, 1, had much to do with breaking
down the distinction between actes de gestion and d'autort.
Berth~lemy and Michoud at one time denied that there was any legitimate
distinction between acts of gestion di domaine priv and gestion die service
public. To both, they would apply principles of private law, and hold the State
responsible. They have had to take note of the development of jurisprudence
in the Council of State, which, until recently particularly, has emphasized the
distinction and declined to apply the rules of the Civil Code to acts of gestion
du service public. Michoud has changed his opinion. 2 Persomtalite morah;.(2d ed.) 281 et seq. MARcQ, op. cit. supra note 3, 245 et seq.
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was practically abandoned, to be replaced by the test of faute de service
or defect or error of the public service.71 Sovereignty and irresponsi-
bility are no longer interchangeable or identical conceptions, and indeed
"sovereignty", is no longer deemed a useful term in analyzing problems
of responsibility. Moreover, the modern judicial evolution of the new
conception of "administrative" acts or acts of public service, and of
faute de service as the basis of responsibility, has resulted in a broad
interpretation of the conception of "fault" and has even produced cer-
tain decisions imposing damages in which no fault, but only an accident
could be established. The evolution of responsibility has gone so far as
to alarm Professor Hauriou, 72 though most of the jurists welcome it as
a sign of progress.
While .it may well be that certain public acts should escape private
action for pecuniary damages, and while it may be that the distinction
between "governmental" and "corporate" acts or functions has outlived
its usefulness, it must nevertheless be recognized that the invention of
the "corporation" and the "corporate" function was the jurist's device
for breaking down the shibboleth of sovereignty and the resulting irre-
sponsibility. In England and the United States, statute alone can abolish
the anachronisms of Kings that do no wrong and States that are above
the law and cannot even be sued. And while in the law of municipal cor-
porations, we have made some inroads into "sovereign immunity" in
tort by discovering the "corporate" function, we still have a long way
to go to rid our law of the artifices, .fictions, symbols and phrases which
have served as excuses to make the group irresponsible.73
' CoT, op. cit. supra note 62, 236 et seq. DuEz, op. cit. supra note 60, 21, 31.
The tendency of the Tribunal of Conflicts and of the Council of State is to segre-
gate a narrow class of gestion privie, left to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts,
and a narrow class of actes de gouvernement, in which no responsibility is ad-
rfiitted. For the rest, aside from legislation and judicial decisions, where irre-
sponsibility, subject to special statutes is the rule, all the public services are
deemed puissance publique, in which the test of responsibility is "fault of the
service" (faute de service publique) with the faute often tenuous and in many
cases not required, responsibility following from the damage rather than from
the fault. See Duez in (1926) 45 REv. CRITIQUE 591.
' Hauriou, in note to case of Regnault-Desroziers, Sirey 1918, -III, 25, 26,
where the State was held liable for damages due to the explosion of shells ac-
cumulated in a fort. Having created a dangerous situation, the State was deemed
responsible for the results. See also Cor, op. cit. supra note 62, 238 et seq. 244,
315, 324. Such wide responsibility, whether fault of the service or not, has long
been demanded by DUGUIT, Transformations du droit public (Paris, 1913) 250;
LAW IN THE MODERN STATE, 206. Cf. Garner, op. cit. supra note 63, 624.
7 E.g., that the city derives no pecuniary benefit from the function; that the
police officer was an agent of the State and not of the city and that hence
respondeat superior does not apply; that cities cannot perform their functions
if made liable for torts of their employees; that the city is not liable for duties
imposed on it by the legislature, but only for those voluntarily assumed; that
powers exercised for the benefit of the public at large are governmental, but
those conferred for its own benefit and by reason of its nature as a municipal
corporation are ministerial or corporate. These and other alleged grounds for
decision will be found, with citations, in Borchard, supra note 69. 130. 132 et sea.
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While reserving for later examination the provisions of positive law
applying the supposed distinction between "corporate" and "govern-
mental" functions or their surviving analogies, it may here be observed
that among the principal reasons for the classical distinction was not
only its historical origin, but the differentiation (in France) between
the judiciary and the administration, and on occasion between private
law and public law. These distinctions may appear strange to the Amer-
ican and English lawyer, accustomed to judicial control over the acts
of private citizens and of officers (personally) and to whom the term
"public law" is still an exotic classification. But on the continent where
the administration was supposed to be free from interference by the
judiciary, other methods had to be devised for protecting the individual
against violation of his rights by public officials. Hence the development
of independent administrative courts and the assumption that they ap-
plied rules of law different from those prevailing in the ordinary judi-
cial courts. Hence also, the accentuated necessity for distinguishing
the "corporate" activities of the State, which through a long evolution
had cbme to be subjected to the rules of private law and to the jurisdic-
tion of the regular courts, from the "governmental" functions of the
State, which were deemed subject not to private law, but to rules of
public policy declarable by public agencies. The gradual weakening of
these distinctions in recent times, both by legislation and judicial con-
struction, so far as concerns State responsibility for the torts of officers,
and the application even in administrative courts of rules closely approx-
imating those of the civil law, have diminished the practical importance
of much of the theoretical discussion of the nineteenth century. The
distinctions have, however, left their mark in the matter of jurisdiction
and they are deeply imbedded in the evolution of tort responsibility. They
are still embodied in statutory provisions and in the decisions of the
courts. They cannot, therefore, be left out of account. Long familiarity
with the subjection of the State and other public corporations to tort
responsibility in "corporate" matters, according to principles of private
law, easily led continental jurists to seek in the principles of private law-
the justification and foundation of responsibility in "governmental"
matters.
PRIVATE LAW THEORIES
Although it had become common in the nineteenth century to rec-
ognize that the relation of the officer to the State or other political group
was founded in peculiar institutions of public law and had no precise
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private law equivalent or analogy,74 efforts were nevertheless made to
apply to the official relation the principles of the Roman nmndatunt-
somewhat similar to but in many respects, notably in tort, radically
different from the modern principles of agency-and of the Roman re-
sponsibility of the owner (dominus) for the acts of his manager (in-
stitor) or captain of a vessel (exercitor navis.)75 It had also been sug-
gested70 that the State was primarily liable not only when "it" was
negligent in the appointment or supervision of officers, but also when
insufficient provision had been made for an adequate number of officers
or for other governmental arrangements to accomplish a particular State
purpose or where the officer's jurisdiction had been insufficiently delim-
ited. These delinquencies, both by way of commission and omission,
were deemed to impose governmental liability on a private law basis.
These conceptions are far removed from Anglo-American law
and were also, up to recently, rejected on the continent on the ground
that there was no private law duty resting upon the State-even where
it was admitted that "legal" duties could be ascribed to the State-to
provide adequate governmental machinery to protect the individual
against loss or injury. Such a duty, within reasonable limits, is imposed
on the State in international law with respect to aliens; and as we shall
observe, the French administrative courts have recently come close to
supporting such a theory, on "public".law grounds, as to residents of
France. It had been early pointed out that the private law analogy was
inappropriate, because of the difference between citizen, officer and
State, among whom there were said to be no ordinary legal relations, on
the one hand, and contractor, agent and principal, on the other hand.
Yet this proposition assumed its premise, for not only is there a legal
relation between officer and citizen in Anglo-American law, but the es-
tablishment of such legal relation in other countries was early a sub-
"'LABAND, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reichs (5th ed. 1911) 429 et seq.
This is the most modern view of the relation. The numerous views which have
prevailed in history are set forth by ZSCHrmNT, Der Beamtenbegriff. vach preus-
sischem Staatsrecht (Breslau, 1913) 14 et seq. The subject will be examined in
another article.
I' See RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (1927) 285 et seq. Z6PFL, Grundziige
des gemeinen Deutschen Staatsrechts (2d ed. 1846) 217. SCHELCHER, op. cit.
supra note 20, 16. Reference has already been made to the private law theory
of negligence in appointment or supervision, which is now rejected in the
doctrine (supra p. 587) but is still occasionally invoked in the courts. It was
rejected in the United States in Lamont v. Stavanaugh, 129 Minn. 321, 152 N. W.
720 (1915), where the city was sought to be held responsible for appointing an
incompetent policeman. Cf. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1925) 34
YALE L. J. 229, 241; 19 R. C. L. 1119, 1120.
For unjust enrichment, the State seems to have been suable on quasi-contractual
theories. No tort theory was necessary to justify recovery. Cf. HA ut, op. cit.
supra note 57, 547 and note.
7 8 MEiSTERLiN, Die Verli1itnisse der Staatsdiener (1838) 99 et seq. paraphrased
in ScHECHER, op. cit. supra note 20, 18.
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ject of legislative and judicial declaration. Whether the State was a
party to the legal relation was the very matter in issue. The theories
advanced rationalized the desire to make it a party.
The early private law analogies and theories of tort responsibility
made no particular distinction between the State as a "corporate" subject
of private law and as a sovereign. Curiously, after the evolution of a
century in which that distinction became the essential element in the
problem, we are now returning, by legislation in Germany and certain
other countries in Central Europe, and by judicial construction in France
and other countries, to a point where the distinction is again nearly dis-
regarded. In the proposed British and American legislation it remains
unmentioned.
Otto Gierke, one of the most learned jurists of modern times, to
whom Maitland paid a tribute rarely equalled," is the spiritual father
of the far-reaching German legislation, now strengthened by constitu-
tional provision, making the State responsible for the torts of its officers
even in "governmental" matters. Having worked out a "real" theory
of the corporation in two monumental works,78 he had come to the con-
clusion, supported by a formidable armory of historical material and
presented with -the persuasiveness and authority of a distinguished
scholar, that the corporation was a "real person," 79 that it had a "will"
manifested by its "organs," that the "organ" and the "corporation" were
one, like the hand or mouth is to man,80 that the State and subordinate
political organizations were "corporations," and that an officer was an
"organ" whose torts were necessarily the torts of the "corporation" and
made it liable. The duty to make compensation for torts, said Gierke, is
based on private law, and group "persons" or corporations are as.much
subject to the private law-in contrast to the criminal law-as are in-
dividuals. The corporate subjection to rules of law is as applicable in
the field of tort as in that of contract. The public corporation's responsi-
bility, added Gierke, is by no means an unusual responsibility determin-
'Maitland, Introduction to GnmxE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE
AGE (1900) viii.
GiERxE, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht (Berlin, 1868-1913) 4v.
GIERKE, Die deutsche Genossenschaftstheorie Und die deutsche Rechtsprech-ung (Berlin, 1887).ln See Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort (1926) 36 YALE L.J 1 7
' This assumption of the unity between corporation and officer, the so-calIed
"organ" theory, is one of the striking postulates of the "real" theory of the
corporation. GIERIKE, Genossenschaftstheorie (1887) 743, 750 et seq. HArrEa,
Die Delikts und Straffdhigkeit der Personenverbinde (Berlin, 1903) 25 et seq.
MICHOuD, op. cit. supra note 28, 401, at 419. The view that the act of the officer
is the act of the corporation is also shared by Windscheid, Stobbe and otherjurists. See citations in SCHELCHER, op. cit. supra note 20, 20, n. 2, and in
GIoaI, op. cit. supra note 24, 543 and his Dottrina delle persone ghtridiche (2d
ed. 1900) III, 153.
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able by public law principles; it is based strictly on private law principles,
the unlawful violation of a private right by an official, though he may be
such by public law and violate public law by his act. Perhaps it should
here be said that much of the theoretical difficulty of classifying the
doctrines of State responsibility arises from the fact that the officer is
an institution of public law, but in his relations with private individuals
is subjected in most countries to many, though not all, of the rules or
analogies to rules prevailing between private individuals. Thus, Gierke
finds theoretical support for his private law classification of the doc-
trine by asserting-and assuming-that the action against the State
rests on the same legal basis as the action against the officer. Gierke
necessarily assumes what Story and others denied,81 namely, that the
officer of the political group, State, province, county or city, was in legal
theory in the same position as the "organ," representative or agent of a
corporation, and also, that he was not an agent with limited powers,
representing a principal, and hence subject to the doctrine of ultra
vires, but that he was identical with the State and that when he acted,
the State acted.8 2
STORY, AGENCY (9th ed. 1882) § 319. See the labored effort of Judge Dillon
to determine when the officer is an "agent" of the municipal corporation, the
doctrine of respondeat superior being applicable. 4 DILLON, MUNICIAL CoRaPoRAs-
TIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 1655, and comments in (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 132 and
(1926) 36 ibid. 40, note 29. MEuccI, op. cit. supra note 24, 186 et seq. undertakes
to show that the officer is a private law agent of the State, but in a character
sui generis.
' The continental distinction between the donee of a power of attorney
(mandatory) and the servant (priposg) is well-known. The powers of the
former are limited and express, and the principal's (mandator's) responsibility
limited to the exercise of the specific powers granted. Ultra vires, therefore, is
a common defense. For the priposi, the general employee, the employer is re-
sponsible in French (§ 1384 C. C.) as in English law, for all torts committed
within the scope of the employment. The French, like the Anglo-American law,
has given a broad construction to the phrase "within the scope" so as to include
"on the occasion of" the employment. The German law has made the principal's
responsibility somewhat narrower. Under § 831 of the CIVIL CODE the em-
ployer's responsibility in tort exists only if the employer has himself been charge-
able with fault, either in the selection of the employee, in the instruction or
order given, in the furnishing of equipment or in the requisite supervision. The
employer, however, has the burden of proving that he is not so chargeable, or
that in spite of his care in these respects the injury would have happened
anyway. In contractual matters, the obligor is responsible to his obligee for
his representatives or assistants, though special contract may provide otherwise.(§278 B. G. B.) 1 ENNECCERUS, Knpp & WOLFF. Lehrbuch des biirgerlichet
Rechts (18-20 ed., part 2, Marburg, 1923) §§ 459, 267.
In France, the responsibility of the employer, even in the old droit coutumier,
taken over by section 1384, rested on a presumed bad choice of the wrong-
doing servant. A considerable authority supports the responsibility upon a sup-
posed free and voluntary selection of the employee by the employer, the em-
ployer's preiumed power of supervision, and, in view of the legally privileged
extension of the employer's range of action, an implied guaranty of the em-
ployee's skill, honesty and character. See PIcOT, op. cit. supra note 3, 83 et seq.
citing authorities. It is probably more correct to say that vicarious responsibility
in such cases is not based on the employer's express or implied fault, but on
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The responsibility of corporations for the torts of their constitu-
tional or managing officers or directors, embodied in most modern codes
and specifically extended to the State when acting in its Fiscus or "cor-
porate" capacity by section 89 of the German civil code, was deemed
by Gierke not an exceptional rule but inherent in the nature of a corpora-
tion. He therefore insisted that this general rule was equally applicable
where the "organ" or officer acted in the exercise of "governmental"
functions. 3 Gierke thus in 1905 began to deny the validity of the distinc-
tions which had grown up through the nineteenth century between
public policy which requires him who profits by the service of employees to as-
sume responsibility for their "official" as distinguished from their private mis-
deeds. ZINGHER, De la responsabiliti civile du commettant (Paris, 1923) 14, 24,
26, 29, 39, 42, 52, 75. DEwiSmE, La notion dn pr~posi en droit civil (1908) 91
et seq. Cf. Holmes, Agency (1891) 4 HAgv. L. REv. 345, 347, 348, 354 et seq.,
5 ibid. 1, 22. Holmes favors the identification theory as the basis of the master's
responsibility. Since Edward I the common law has made sheriffs and others
liable for inferior officers unless the latter are independently appointed. Ibid. 356.
Cf. BAT, VIcAluous LIAsLiTY, (1916) 15, 16, 27.
For the distinction between responsibility for a mandatory and for an em-
ployee, see PicoT, op. cit. supra note 3, 101 et seq.
The French judicial courts, having jurisdiction over acres de gestion priv6e
have usually invoked article. 1384 C. C. to hold the State or subdivision respon-
sible as an employer for the acts of officers. In Germany, the Fiscus (State in
its "corporate" functions) is responsible for the torts of its constitutional
"organs" or managing officials by virtue of §§ 89 and 31 B. G. B. For the
acts of its employees of minor grade, it is responsible only under the qualifica-
tions of §§ 831 and 278 B. G. B. supra. In its character as a "public power"
("governmental" or "sovereign" functions) the State has by statute (1909 for
Prussia, 1910 for the Reich, and CONSTITUTION OF 1919, art. 131) been made
responsible for the torts of officers injuring citizens, thus assuming a responsi-
bility which § 839 B. G. B. had theretofore left with the officer personally. 1
ENNECCERUS, Kn'Pi & WOLFF, op. cit. (22-24 ed. Marburg, 1924) 1, §§ 103, 112.
'Gierke's principal contributions to this theory will be found in his Ge-
nossenschaftstheorie; op. cit. supra note 80, c. 4, 620, 642, 743, 766, 784, 788; In
his Deutsches Privatrecht (1895) 1, § 61; and in (1905) 28 DEUTSCHER JU'IS-
TENTAG 1, 102.
The view that governmental responsibility has a private law basis is shared
by many courts and writers. See decision of German Supreme Court, March
30, 1903. Reichsmilitiirfiskus, 54 R. G. 198, and of the Swiss Supreme Court Comp.
de la Suisse Occidentale v. Confederation, Dec. 21, 1877, 3 B. G. 780, 790. Banque
Populaire v. Canton of'Vaud (law of 1904 on State responsibility) Oct. 13, 1909,
35 B. G. (2) 721, 728. Bossi v. Ticino, Apr. 27, 1912. 38 B. G. (2) 260. Balzaretti v.
Geneva, May 9, 1912, ibid. 393, 397. JELLINEIX, System der subjcktivc Sifentlichen
Rechte (2d ed. 1905) 245. Oertmann, Die Haftung des Staatcs fiir Vcrschzlden
von Beamten, (1906) 11 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 922 ct seq. FRAENiEL,
Haftet in Preussen der Beamite aits rechtswidrigen Handlunm bci Ausiibung von
Hoheitsrechten dem Gesclhidigten unzittelbar? (Borna-Leipzig, 1916) 24 ct seq.
The determining fact is the tortious invasion of a private right. The argument
often advanced in Germany and Switzerland in favor of the "public law" basis of
responsibility for "governmental" acts, namely, that such responsibility was
specifically left by the civil codes fo the option of the constituent states of the fed-
eration (GEiu=AN CiviL CODE, Introduction, art. 77, Swiss CIVIL CODE, arts. 6, 59),
and that it required therefore special legislation to impose such responsibility, is not
deemed conclusive by some writers; they argue that the responsibility itself, though
resting on statute, may nevertheless be subject to the rules of private law. See e.g.
ScH&frz, op. cit. supra note 10, 15, 16, 66; voN BERNEGG, op. cit. supra note 31,
74-76; DocK, op. cit. supra note 22, 244 at 277; CHIRONI, op. cit. suprnote 19
(Colpa contrattuale) 515 et seq.
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"governmental" and "corporate" acts and the resulting rules as to re-
sponsibility. In France, the distinction began to break down at about
the same time. Only in the American law of municipal corporations does
the distinction,-which is not without some factual basis,-and its very
important legal consequences, persist with all the conviction of a theo-
logical creed. Its historical utility for predicating a limited responsibil-
ity may be admitted without conceding its permanent value, or, in prac-
tical application, its logic or expediency. Gierke, like others after him,
maintained that it was always the same officer and the same State
whether acting in one or the other capacity, and he added that the dis-
tinction between "State" (governmental sovereign) and "Fiscus" (ad-
ministrator of public property) was outworn and useless.8 4 Indeed, the
distinction is now in the main one of convenience only, for purposes of
theory, though it was long of the utmost practical importance, not only
in its procedural aspects, where it still plays an important part, but also
in the matter of substantive responsibility. With the extension of re-
sponsibility to "governmental" activities, it naturally has lost not only
much of its practical importance, but some of its theoretical justification.
Gierke settled his classification when he assumed his major premise
that the action for compensation based on "fault" must be one of private
law. He then adduced private law grounds to justify his premise, be-
lieved by him to be a conclusion. German jurists do not seem to have
paid much attention to the anomaly created by the fact that in Fiscus
matters, the State or public corporation is unqualifiedly responsible only
for the faults of its higher directing officials, whereas for minor officials
and employees it is responsible only if it cannot rebut the presumption
of fault;85 whereas in "governmental" matters, the Reich and most of
I1 GirRaKE, Deutsches Privatrecht (Berlin, 1895) 476. While many jurists
agree that there are not two separate institutions, "State" and "Fiskus," as the
older theory had assumed, the majority probably still insist that the one single
State or other public corporation enters into legal relations with its citizens,
through its officers, in two different capacities, as a governing authority ("gov-
ernmental," "iffentliche Gewalt") and as a manager of property ("corporate").
Perhaps this is merely a different way of expressing the same phenomenon.
It must be remembered that §§ 89 and 31 B. G. B. apply only to the higher
managing officials. For minor employees the Fiscus is responsible 4ike any other
employer under § 831, which enables the employer to escape responsibility by
proving a complete absence of fault on his part (supra). The French employer's
responsibility is not thus qualified or rebuttable. But in "governmental" matters,
the German statutes of 1909 and 1910 and the CoNsTiTuTioN OF 1919 speak only of
Beamte (officers) without distinction as to rank.
' In this respect it is analogous to the Swiss law, CoDE OF OBLIGATIONs, art.
55 (333 Z. G. B.). 1 RosSEL ET MENTHA, Manuel du droit federal des obligations(4th ed. Lausanne, 1920) 107; OSER, Das Obligationenrecht (Zurich, 1915) 230.
The presumption of fault of the master, rebuttable by proof to the contrary, com-
mon to both German and Swiss law, is modified in the case of corporations (in
German law) by imposing absolute responsibility for the torts of directing officials.
It is often extremely difficult to determine who is a "constitutionally designated
representative" or "higher" official within the meaning of § 31 B. G. B. To.
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the States have by statute assumed without qualification, the responsi-
bility which theretofore had rested on the officer, without distinction of
rank. This assumption of responsibility is regarded by some as further
evidence of the private law nature of. the obligation-vicarious liability
cx lege for the fault of a servant.86 One writer, whose theory, however,
has found little support, has suggested that this statutory responsibility
may be deemed a statutory assignment of a debt or novation, though
the statutes have simply substituted the State for the officer, leaving
direct legal relations subsisting only between the injured individual and
the State.87 Others regard the State merely as a principal under article
831 of the Civil Code, which creates a rebuttable presumption of fault
on the part of the master for the torts of his servant ;88 but in fact the
statutory responsibility of the State is not founded on a rebuttable pre-
sumption of fault, but on an irrebuttable presumption-a rule of law-
either that the torts of its "organs" are its own,89 or that the State has
assumed absolute responsibility for the torts of its servants.
make the Fiscus responsible, such higher official must himself be chargeable with
responsibility, usually for "fault." Under § 831, which covers minor em-
ployees and agents as well, the employee or agent need not be personally respon-
sible for the damage done, but the responsibility of the employing Fiscus is not
unconditional, as under sec. 31; it is conditional on its inAbility to prove that it was
not negligent in appointing or supervising the employee or that it had not by its
own negligence "caused" the damage. For the torts of minor employees, there-
fore, State responsibility in Fiscus matters is limited. GERECHTER, Haftung des
preussische) Risenbahifiskus (Berlin, 1911) 66 et seq. On the difficulty of de-
termining who is an "organ" or "higher official" under § 31 see decision of
German Supreme Court (1897) 19 R. G. no. 67, and FitouBaaG, Die Haftung des
Fiskus fir seine Verfreter (Borna-Leipzig, 1908) 27 et seq.
For Austrian law on the responsibility of the Fiscus, which closely reseinbles
that of Germany, see 1 STUBENRAUCH, Kommentar zum 6sterr. A. B. G. B. (6th
ed. 1892) §§ 26, 27.
In Swiss law, in general, the tort-feasor is alone responsible. Hence, a gen-
eral responsibility of the State for private-law acts of officers, except in given
cantons like Schwyz, is not recognized. Where the State conducts an industry,
however, liability is imposed unless the State can prove that it took all necessary
measures to prevent the damage (art. 62 of the LAw OF OBLIGATIONS). SCHNriDR-
FIcK, Das schweizerische Obligationenrecht (2d ed. 1896) art. 64, n, 8. On the
evolution of the "organ" from the "representative" or "agent" see FRomBEaG, op.
cit. supra note 85, 11.
SFRAkENKEL, op. cit. supra note 83, 31. This is the principle underlying the
pending Act of Congress, H. R. 9285, 70th Cong., 1st sess., sec. 1. This corre-
sponds in the case of corporations, who can only act through representatives, to act-
ing at their peril. OERTMANN, Bayerisches Landesprivairecht (Halle, 1903) 256
et seq. See also MEuccr, op. cit. supra note 24, 186 et seq.;. CHIRONI, op. Cit.
supra note 19, 515 et seq., and authorities cited by GIORGI, op. cit. sapra note 24(Obbligazioni) 542.
Bechmann, quoted by OERTMANN, op. cit. supra note 86, 256. Whether the
officer actually is excluded from all obligation to the citizen, we shall have occasion
later to examine.
'Jakubezky, cited by FRAENKEL, op. cit. supra note 83, 30.
' Section 31 avoids the use of the word "organ," which Gierke emphasized.
It has been doubted in view of the Motive of the CIVIL CODE [1 MUGDAN, Die
gesamten Materialien zun B. G. B., (Berlin, 1899) 408, 618] whether section 31
intended to adopt the Gierke theory, as is usually assumed. FPANIMrL, op. Cit.
supra note 83, 31. Minor employees or officials can hardly be deemed "organs,"
however.
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The French jurists who have dealt with this question have on the
whole divided their allegiance to theories along the lines of the classical
distinction between "corporate" and "governmental" acts, which at one
time reflected moderately a jurisdictional distinction between the judicial
and the administrative courts. For actes de gestion-which in his view
included doinaine privg and service public-Michoud, for example,90
supported by certain decisions of the Court of Cassation, was willing
to concede that the State was a corporation, governed by the civil law
rules of direct responsibility for the acts of its "organs," under article
1382 C. C. and indirect responsibility for the acts of its employees
(pr~poses) under 1384 C. C.91 Whether adopting the "fiction" or the
"real" theory of a corporation, both jurists and courts found theories
upon which to sustain corporate responsibility for the torts of corporate
officers and employees.9 2 So long as the judicial courts had jurisdiction
o Op. cit. supra note 28, at 419. Curiously, down to 1905, the judicial courts
assumed jurisdiction of actions in tort against communes and.departments and held
them liable under application of the civil code, not only for acts of private gestion,
but of public gestiom as well, and also for acts of police, usually classified as
puissance publique. TIssSlER, op. cit. supra note 23, 101 and notes. MARcQ, op. cit.
supra note 3, 244.
"The Belgian code (art. 1384) the Italian code (art. 1153) and the Rouma-
nian code (art. 1101) are identical with the French code. Probably most of the
writers on these codes have adopted the theory that vicarious responsibility of the
master for the torts of his servant is based not on fault, express or implied, but
on a rule of policy that he who profits by service must assume the risks of the
servant's torts committed in the course of the service. ZINGHER, op. cit. supra note
82, 105 et seq., MAAG, Zivilrechtliche Haftung fiir schidigendes Verhalten Dritter
(Affoltern, 1924) 40 et seq. It thus becomes but one aspect of the public law
risk" theory. Numerous French and other writers have found little difficulty in
applying the rules of civil responsibility to the State as the "commettant" or master
of its "priposis" officers, when engaged in actes de gestion, i.e., proprietary or
corporate activities. See the authorities quoted in PIcoT, op. cit supra note 3, 128
et seq. MARcQ, op. cit. supra note 3, 324 et seq. The Germans have little doubt on
this point, 1 MUGDAN, op. cit. supra note 89, 409. Some of the earlier French
civilians were even willing to apply article 1382 et seq. to the State when acting as a
puissance pubique. 5 MAnA, Explication thJorique et pratique dic code Na-
pohion (6th ed. Paris, 1869) 281, n. 2. AUBRY E RAn, Coirs de droit civil
fran~ais, (4th ed. 1869) IV, 761. [The editor of the 5th ed. (1920), Prof. Bartin,
points out th e, courts and doctrine have now repudiated these views, VI, 389,note] DE SOLOMBE, Cours de code napol~on (1882) XXXI, 637. See the decisionsof the Court of Cassation, Adm. d. Postes v. Depeyre, April 1, 1845. Sirey 1845, I,
363, and Adm. des Postes v. Brun, Dec. 19, 1854, Sirey 1855, I, 265. Inactions against departments and communes, the Court of Cassation has often ap-
plied the civil code [see decision of May 2, 1906, quoted by TEtssIER op. cit. sipra
note 23, 108, note] but more recently has declined to do so. Adm. des Douanes v.Zwaertwaegher, Feb. 19, 1918, Dalloz 1921, 1, 215, and VAN DER DluSSCnrE,D la faut e e fction dm _ du prpos v . (Lille, 1924), 101. Chironi makes no dis-
tinction as to function, corporate or governmental, op..,cit supra note 19, 520.
2 For minor employees (pr~pos~s) there seems to be agreement that article
1384 applies. For managers and higher officials, different views prevail, both in
the courts and among jurists. One school considers them all representatives of thecorporation, and applies article 1384. Another (the "real" theory school) con-
siders them "organs," like Gierke, and applies article 1382. Another school con-
siders them mandataries with strictly limited powers, and applies article 1998; butwhen the associates (in a private corporation) can themselves be proved in fault.
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over actes de gestion, particularly of those of the minor political sub-
divisions of the State, and necessarily applied the rules of the civil code,
the private law explanation of State responsibility presented little diffi-
culty,98 regardless of the varying justifications for vicarious responsi-
in having authorized the tort, or chosen a dangerous employee, or facilitated the
injury by their own act, article 1382 is applied. The decisions of the courts seem
in confusion. As vicarious responsibility can best be explained not on any theory
of fault and as it seems natural to regard all officers of the corporation as agents
or employees, there hardly seems much reason to introduce so much confusion
into the doctrine of corporate responsibility for the torts of its employees. See
ZiNGnER, op. cit. supra note 82, 75 et seq. The effort to distinguish "organs" from
"employees," i.e., higher from lower officials, and to attach different legal conse-
quences to the distinction is prevalent in the writings of many jurists. It probably
finds its source in the peculiar doctrines of the German lav of corporations, largely
promoted by Gierke, which distinguish corporate responsibility for "organs" or gov-
erning officials (art. 31 B. G. B.) and that for employees (art. 839 B. G. B.). The
distinction is explained in MICHOUD, La thiorie de la personnalitM morale (2d ed.
Paris 1924) 128 et seq. The application of the distinction to different types of
officers is not always easy, and in France it has theoretical interest only, because
the responsibility of the public corporation is the same in both cases.
' Down to 1860 in France, scientific doctrine was but little concerned with
the theory of State responsibility. Within the limited field of acts (gestion privee)
for which responsibility was judicially imposed, article 1384 cc. was deemed suffi-
cient support. After 1860, and especially after the Blanco decision of 1873, the
question of theory was vigorously agitated. LAROMBILRE, op. cit. supra n9te 29,
VII, 617, art. 1384, holds the State to the same responsibility as an ordinary mas-
ter for the acts of its officers performing "corporate" (gestion) functions, such as
tax collectors, public depositaries, customs, postal, railroad, and other like officials.
The function, not the particular act, is determinative. Sourdat [TraihM gin"Iral
de la responsabiliti (6th ed. 1911) art. 1384, No. 15] adopts somewhat the same
view, and insists that the officer is not merely a mandatary, with limited respon-
sibility, but a general employee under art. 1384. He emphasizes, however, the
nature of the act as more determinative than the particular function. These views
are based on the premise that the State may freely choose and control its em-
ployees. LAURENT, op. cit. supra note 41, XX, § 593, divides officers into those,
acting in the name and for the account of the State, such as postal, telegraph, and
State factory employees, and others, such as judges, teachers, etc., who are not
"employees" but "organs." Only for the former should the State be theoretically
responsible. This view has been criticized. Picot, op. cit. supra note 3, 135;
MARcQ, op. cit. supra note 3, 329. Laurent makes a supposed distinction between
"sovereignty," which he deems irresponsible, and the exercise of sovereign powers,
which require analysis, some entailing responsibility, others not, ibid. XX, §§ 418
et seq., 590 et seq. Legislative and judicial acts escape responsibility; executive or
administrative acts, in principle, do not. All administrative powers must be used so
as not to injure private rights, and to these art. 1382 et seq. apply, ibid. § 420, p. 440.
Lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act is thus immaterial, and there is no distinction
between "governmental" and "corporate" acts, though he seems to admit that dis-
tinction indirectly when he distinguishes "employees" from "organs." Eminent do-
main theories and the so-called doctrine of vested rights have influenced Laurent
strongly. The theory of vested rights as a limitation on governmental powers,
though given statutory expression for takings by eminent domain hardl, fur-
nishes a sufficiently concrete basis for governmental pecuniary responsibility for
other official injuries. See infra. This would be true even if for argument's
sake, it could be admitted that § 1382 et seq. justifies governmental responsi-
bility or responsibility without fault, and even if it may be said thht eminent domain
admits away the case for "sovereign" irresponsibility. Nor is it satisfactory to
say that when the "government" is made responsible, it is as a "corporation" and
not a "'government." See MARcQ, op. cit. supra note 3, 335 et seq.
Michoud has adopted Gierke's view of direct responsibility for "organs"
(art. 1382), but prefers to consider minor employees as pr4posis under art. 1384.
The private law theory, as advanced by its principal supporters, is discussed
in LE Roux, Essai sur la notion de la responsobiliti de l'Etat (1909) 40 et seq.
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bility of the master for the servant-fault in appointment or supervision,
personal act by representation, or merely the public policy that he
who obtains the benefit of another's service must assume the risks of
unlawful injuries inflicted in the course of the employment. But when
the administrative courts assumed jurisdiction of all actes de gestion
publique, both of the State and its political subdivisions and independent
establishments, confining the judicial courts to a limited class of acts
de gestion priv~e, it became more difficult to sustain a private law ex-
planation of responsibility.94 The administrative courts were not bound
by the civil code, did not profess to apply it and in late years have de-
parted from the strict requirements of individual culpability or fault
by inventing the concept of faute de service and have even imposed
responsibility in certain cases for mere accidents in the public service.9 5
Possibly because the French gestion publique was somewhat wider
The votaries of administrative law, whose doctrinal views, instead of search-
ing for principles historically and analytically, as do the civilians, follow and
rationalize the decisions of the courts, seemed to believe, down to about 1885, that
when the officer could be deemed a servant or priposi of a group acting as a cor-
'poration (gestion), the group was responsible under art. 1384, but that when it
acted as a "public power" or "sovereign" (puissance publique) there was no re-
sponsibility. See the views of Dufour, Cotelle and Dareste set forth by Picor, op.
cit. supra note 3, 139 et seq. But when the Council of State developed the new
intermediate category of actes de gestion publique and imposed responsibility, new
theories were advanced, which declined to admit any private law basis for State
responsibility. The main attack lay against the common view that the State was
a master or the officer a servant (prposg). It was argued that the CIVIL CODE
articles 1382 et seq. contemplated only individual or collective private "persons," that
the State acting in its "governmental" capacity (puissance publique) was not a
"private person," that the draftsmen of the Code never thought of including the
public administration under such terms as master (commettant) servant (prgposg)
or men (homnes), and that the private law theory was inherently unsound. The
most celebrated spokesman of this school was LAFERRIkRE, op. cit. supra note 27,
I, 677 et seq. He remarks that masters and mandators appoint servants and
mandatories for their own private interests, whereas the State appoints officials for
the administration of the general interests. Ibid. I, 624. The official relation is
not analogous to that of private contract between employer and employee, and
State responsibility is not founded on any code text, but on general principles ofjustice, which, however, he admits, also underlie the code provisions governing the
relation of individual to individual. While Laferri~re has been sharply challenged
on all these contentions, he has nevertheless deeply influenced the Council of State,
which apparently considers itself emancipated from any dependence on texts or
particular legal doctrines, and is more inclined to follow its own precedents, in-
formed by an enlightened policy gradually extending the range of State respon-
sibility.
The historical mistrust of the judicial courts in France. and* the manifest
Revolutionary purpose of refusing to permit them to control the administration
or interfere with its relations with private citizens, lend support to the view that
it was not intended by the draftsmen of the Code or by legislatures that private
law was to apply to relations between citizen and State. Writers who, like
Michoud, argued for the application of rules of private law to the State in the
administration of the public services (gestion publique) admitted- the historical
data but maintained that the legislators of the time did not prohibit the applica-
tion of the civil code. From the evidence, Ren6 Marcq reaches a contrary con-
clusion. See MAcQ, op. cit. supra note 3, 291 et seq.
"Supra, p. 603.
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in its field of application than the German Fiscus, there was less con-
currence in France than in Germany in agreeing on a private law ex-
planation of responsibility even in "corporate" matters. Those who
adhered to a public law solution pointed out that by the civil code, even
slight negligence would make the officer responsible, whereas in fact
in such cases only the State is held. Only serious torts make the officer
jointly responsible and if actuated by malice or passion or if guilty of
gross delinquency (faits personnels), at least down to 1916, the officer
alone was responsible, whereas under article 1384 the employer would
be responsible even in that event.96 Since 1916, as we shall see, the
State has been held responsible even for "personal" acts of officers, if
committed on the occasion of public service. The disciples of "public
law" point out the numerous differences in freedom of choice and action
between State and private corporation and show that whereas the civil
code predicates liability on fault, the State is responsible on different
principles in many cases, for it is not responsible for all torts, nor is it
responsible merely for tort, as, for example, in eminent domain and
injuries inflicted in the construction of public works.97 Indeed, as we
shall see, the French administrative courts have built up a jurisprudence
of governmental responsibility founded on the fact of injury due to
the defective operation of the public service (faute administrative or
faute de service) without inquiring whether any particular officer was
personally negligent.P8
It is further argued that the State in its relation to the individual
It is argued that the alleged reason for employer's liability, negligence in
selecting or supervising employees, cannot apply to the State, for it has little or
no opportunity to select or supervise. Selection is done under civil service rules
or other method foreclosing complete freedom of choice. Supervision is prac-
tically impossible. In other respects, also, the courts treat the State's respon-
sibility for officers somewhat differently than they do the employer's respon-
sibility for servants, which is advanced as an additional ground disproving the
applicability of private law. MARcQ, op. cit. supra note 3, 311 ct seq.
'HAuxiou, Pricis (9th ed.) op. cit. supra note 57, 548, 835; voN BERNErG,
op. cit. supra note 31, 8, 12, 17. Further criticisms of the private law theory,
founded largely on the arguments of LAFERRIPRE, op. cit. supra note 27, will be
found in ROGER, op. cit. supra note 41, 36 et seq.; LE Roux, op. cit. supra note 91,
43 et seq. Cf. RouAsT, Du fondement de la responsabiliti des doninages caust's
aux personnes par les travaux publics (Paris, 1910) cc. 2, 4.
Duoui, LAw IN THE MODERN STATE (1919) 233 ct seq. GARNER, Op. cit.
supra note 63, 621. TIRARD, op. cit. supra note 27, 62. BIGOT, op. cit. supra, note
32, 87, 184. HAuRIOU, op. cit. supra note 57, 528. voN BERNEGG, op. Cit. supra note
31, 11. WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARrY LITIGA2NT (1927) 147 et seq. and infra.
Some of the earlier decisions of the Court of Cassation frankly held the
State responsible by application of the civil code. Depeyre, (1845) Dalloz 45, 1,
261; Brun (1854) Dalloz 55, 1, 37. Later the Council of State held that respon-
sibility for acts of gestion publique rested on the exigencies of the administration
and the necessity of reconciling public and private interests. Rothschild, Dec. 6,
1855, Dalloz 1859, 3, 34, Bigot, p. 25. The final denial that private law principles
controlled was expressed by the Tribunal of Conflicts in the celebrated Blanco case
(1873) supra, p. 590.
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is in a unique position, and cannot be brought within the compass of
private law. Private law, it is said, contemplates relations between
equals, admits of bargaining, assumes the promotion of individual in-
terests, assumes a privilege of withdrawing from the relation, enables an
unsatisfied obligation to be enforced by specific performance and judg-
ments to be executed by forced levy, if necessary. The State's relation
to the individual, it is argued, is not a relation between equals, capable
of bargaining and seeking personal advantage. It is a relation imposed
by law, and contemplates the promotion of the public welfare without
special pecuniary advantage to the State. There is no privilege of with-
drawing from the relation, suit is possible only within permitted limits
and hardly ever for specific performance and the judgment cannot be
executed by a levy on State property. It is further argued that when
private law rules are applied to the State as a property owner, this is
by way of exception only and 'is permitted because no harm is thereby
done, but that this affords no ground for extending private law rules
to the administration of the public services (gestion publique). Indeed,
in the latter- function, the State as a governing authority is always in
evidence, and it is a denial of facts to assert that the State then, or at
any time, acts like a private individual and is or should be subject to the
rules governing private individuals.9 9 In fact, it is said, the distinction
between gestion publique and puissance publique is theoretical only,
and is impossible to apply a priori, a conclusion which finds sup-
port in the fact that the classification is not consistently applied in any
decade and that the supposed line of division is continually moving. The
arguments mentioned have been employed by some to deny State re-
sponsibility in tort and by others to deny that such responsibility rests on
any other than public law grounds.
The so-called public law orientation of the Council of State has
been attacked by adherents of theories of private law who invoke the
argument that the certainty of the provisions of the civil code has been
exchanged for the uncertainty of variable equitable determinations-
reaching a result, however, closely analogous to that of the private law.
Equity is deemed to be not a legal, but a moral, ground of responsibility,
proper for the cognizance of the legislature rather than the courts; to
which answer is made that no statutory text is necessary, if responsi-
bility accords with the general spirit of the law and is founded on prin-
' For a r~sum6 of these several grounds for denying the applicability of pri-
vate law, see MARCQ, op. cit. supra note 3, 296 et seq. These arguments are also
employed to prove that the State is not responsible in tort under any circumstances
except by express statute. For ref utations of these views see WODON, op. Cit. supra
note 63, 181 et seq. and CA1ART, Droit administratif gILmentaire (2d ed. 1924)
.334 et seq.
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ciples which are as valid as any text written into statute.10 0 Common
law lawyers will have no difficulty in appreciating the force of the
answer.
The theory of faute administrative, it is further contended, rests
upon a confusion of substantive law and jurisdiction, the erroneous con-
clusion having been drawn that the jurisdiction of administrative courts
excluded the application of private law.10' Possibly such intangible and
difficult issues as "fault," "negligence," etc., are deemed by these writers
to be more certain in application than they really are, for they are often
alleged in decisions merely to reach a desirable result. Perhaps the objec-
tive test of damage, adopted by the Council of State, is both more prac-
tical and efficient, obviating the necessity of introducing what is often the
fiction of personal fault or negligence. In this respect, it may be said
to have advanced beyond the outlived restrictions on the theory of re-
sponsibility imposed by the words of the civil code.
Those jurists and courts who erect the premise that State responsi-
bility in "governmental" matters is exclusively an innovation of public
law, necessarily conclude that the supporting grounds or theories must
find their explanation in public law. These jurists adopt the view that
the relation of officer to citizen, and a fortiori, of State to citizen, is one
of public law. Though conceding, perhaps fatally to their theory, that
the State is responsible under private law rules when acting in its "cor-
porate" capacity, they deny that this is so when acting in its "govern-
mental" capacity °. 0 2 They thus divide the individual's rights into those
finding their protection in private law and those resting on public law.
The nature of the activity determines the classification. It is also denied
that the officer exercising "public" functions represents the State as a
"corporation," a subject of private law, and it is asserted that when he
acts unlawfully, he ceases to represent the "will of the State"-the
familiar ultra vires argument. Gierke's suggestion that responsibility
for "governmental" acts must be discharged by the State as a "Fiscus,"
is regarded as an unhappy resurrection of the antiquated concept of the
Fiscus and as destructive of the modern scientific achievement in clas-
sifying the activities of the State into two groups, "governmental" and
"corporate."' 0 3 The confusion that theoretical speculation can induce
103 RoGER, op. cit. supra note 41, 43.
B'BA=Y, op. cit. supra note 58, 78 et seq.
BERTHLEMY, op. cit. supra note 41, 87 et seq.
'The confusion was aided by the drafts and Motive (basic explanations) of
the German civil code. They speak of the "public law" nature of the claim for
compensation, whereas the Motive to the Introductory Law speaks of its "close
relation to public law," but emphasizes that the duty to pay is one of private law.
See 1 MUGDAN, Op. cit. supra note 89, 40.
'SCHELcER, op. cit. supra note 20, 21 et seq.; also SCHELCHER, Justio u. Ver-
waltung (Leipzig, 1919) 176 and authorities there cited.
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is illustrated by the fact that some jurists have concluded that the result-
ing responsibility is one of public law, justified on private law grounds or
analogies 04 and others that it is one of private law, but explainable
only on arguments deduced from public law ;1o5 others still that after
the State assumes the responsibility it is one of private law.10 6 Perhaps
this shows as clearly as anything else the futility of the classifications
and juristic explanations advanced to justify a socially desirable result.
But to the continental lawyer, more scientifically and historically trained
in general than his colleague of the Anglo-American bar, the jural clas-
sification is of great importance; and in justification, it must be said that
in the development of the doctrine of responsibility, procedural and
substantive, the classification has played a vital part. In the French
courts, it has served largely to determine whether the judicial or ad-
ministrative courts had jurisdiction, a function it still to some extent
performs; in Germany, it influenced the framing of legislation. The
German Civil Code of 1900 left it to the individual states to determine
to what extent the State would be liable in "governmental" matters.10 7
Gierke's argument that there was no justifiable basis for any distinction
between "governmental" and "corporate" functions in the matter of
official responsibility was designed to point out the unwisdom of having
made the civil code responsibility cover only "corporate" activities,
leaving responsibility for "governmental" functions to the confusion
of divergent state legislation. He lived to see Prussia (1909) and the
Empire (1910) adopt general statutes assuming responsibility for the
torts of Prussian and Federal officers respectively, in "governmental"
matters, but he died before the Constitution of 1919 adopted the general
principle that Empire and states must assume responsiblity for the torts
of officers inflicting priiate injuries within the scope of their employ-
ment, regardless of the nature of the function. 0 1 Much the same de-




'o' See SCHELCHER, op. cit. supra note 20, 21 et seq.
1( PILOTY, op. cit. supra note 25, 245 et seq.
Docx, op. cit. supra note 22, 244 at 277. Cf. FRAENKEL, op. cit. supra note
83, 24.
Article 77 of the INTRODUCTORY LAW.
Infra.
I" tnfra.
